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l. SUMMARY: In No. 86-509, the United States argues that 42 
U.S.C. §602(a) (38), which requires 
parents, sisters, and brothers ~~ ving 
~-~
that the f all 
together be considered for 
purposes of determining the amount of assistance a family should 
~~ G~~j Y2~ 
• > • 
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receive from the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
Clause, or the Equal Protection component of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In No. 86-564, North Carolina 
officials adopt that argument and contend in addition that the d 
ct improperly ordered them to pay retroactive AFDC benefits out 
of the state treasury, in violation of the Eleventh Amendment. 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: In 1971, the State of North 
j, ~t 
Carolina adopted regulations that required chriu-support income 
to be considered as a" \ amily resour? e in the computation of a 
------- ~
family's eligibility for AFDC benefits. Those regulations were 
found to be inconsistent with the federal statutory scheme then 
in effect, and the State was enjoined from "directly or 
indirectly reducing, or continuing to reduce, withholding, or 
continuing to withhold, the payment to AFDC beneficiaries of any 
funds on the basis of crediting outside income or resources of 
one or more members of the family group without first 
determining that such income is legally available to all members 
of the family group." G i 11 i a r d v . Craig , 3 31 F • s u pp . 58 7 
(W.D.N.C. 1971), aff'd without opinion, 409 U.S. 807 (1972). In 
1984, Congress amended the statutes governing the AFDC program. 
One of the amendments, now codified at 42 u.s.c. §602(a) (38), 
provided that the income of any parent or sibling who lives with 
a dependent child must be included in determining the 
eligibility of the family for AFDC benefits. The federal govt 
promulgated regulations to implement this requirement, and the 
State followed suit. The State began applying its regulations 
- 3 -
in October 1984, without attempting t~ get the 1971 injunction 
lifted. In May of 19 85, appellees, who were members of the 
plaintiff class in Gi 11 i ard v. Craig, moved the d ct for 
enforcement of the 1971 injunction. State officials, appellants 
here, subsequently moved for relief from the injunction on the 
ground that federal statutes and regulations required the State 
to act inconsistently with the terms of 1971 injunction. They 
also filed a third-party complaint against the Secretary of HHS, 
asking that the federal govt share any liability. In May 1986, 
the d ct held that the State had violated the 1971 injunction, 
and ordered it to pay out to class members the AFDC benefits 
that had been withheld. Even if §602(a) (38) had removed the 
legal justification for the 1971 injunction, the d ct held, the 
State was required to abide by the terms of the injunction until 
it was lifted by the court. The d ct also refused to lift the 
injunct ion prospectively. Although §602(a) (38) did authorize 
the federal and state governments to issue the regulatjons they 
issued, that provision was unconstitutional, and therefore the 
injunct ion remained in ef feet. The d ct' s first object ion to 
§602(a) (38) was that it was an unconstitutional taking. Under 
State law (and sometimes pursuant to private contractual 
arrangements) the child on whose behalf child-support is being 
paid has a right that that child-support be used solely for her 
or his benefit. Section §602(a) (38), in combination with 42 
u.s.c. §602 (a) (26) (A), which requires that participants in AFDC 
programs assign to the state their rights to receive child-
support payments, together operate to ensure that any child 
.... 
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whose parent participates in the AFDC program will lose her or 
his right to have child-support payments used solely for her or 
his benefit. That loss of a right is a taking, even though AFDC 
program is nominally voluntary, since the child has no choice as 
to whether or not to participate in the AFDC program, and 
impoverished mothers have no real choice. Th~ ct also held 
that §602 (a) (38) violated the Due Process Clause and the Equal 
Protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. The statute confronts those who wish to participate 
in the AFDC program with the harsh choice of either sacrificing 
one of their children's rights to child support in order to 
obtain AFDC benefits for the rest of their children or sending 
the child who receives child support to live elsewhere; in 
virtue of this substantial effect upon the ability of families 
to stay together, the statute therefore is properly subjected to 
heightened scrutiny. Furthermore, the ~atute cannot survive 
that scrutiny. The govt's sole purpose in enacting the statute 
is to save money, but that goal cannot be achieved at the cost 
of the integrity of the family and the rights of children to 
receive child support. 
After the appellants filed an unsuccessful motion for 
reconsideration, they brought this appeal. 
3. CONTENTIONS: In No. 86-509: ( 1) The d ct improperly 
held that §602(a) (38) was an unconstitutional taking. AFDC is a 
voluntary program. It is true that §602(a) (38) imposes a new 
condition on families that seek to participate in that program, 
i.e., that they must assign to the state the right to receive 
- 5 -
child-support payments of all children , l .iving with them, rather 
than just of all children that they wish to claim as needy 
dependents. But it is has never been and could not properly be 
held that the government takes property from someone that it 
rationally requires to give up property as a condition of 
receiving a benefit from the state. (2) The d ct improperly 
held that the impact of §602(a) (38) on family-based decisions 
was so great as to justify subjecting it to heightened scrutiny 
under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection component 
of the Due Precess Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Lyng v. 
Castillo, 106 S. Ct. 2727 (1986), expressly held that 
governmental actions that do not "directly and substantially" 
inte.c.::: c re with family based decisions should be subjected to 
rationality review rather than heightened scrutiny. Section 
§602(a) (38) does not give rise to such interference. Moreover, 
§602(a) (38) is clearly rational; it expresses the reasonable 
legislative judgment that families that contain a member with 
substantial outside income are generally less needy than 
families without such a member. 
In No. 86-546: The State reiterates most of the contentions 
advanced by the govt in No. 86-509. The State also contends, 
however, that the d ct improperly held that it had violated the 
1971 injunct ion. That injunct ion essentially pro hi bi ted the 
State only from acting in ways that violated the federal 
statutes governing the AFDC program. After Congress amended 
those statutes, the action that had been made unlawful by the 
injunct ion was no lange r unlawful. In any event, even if the 
- 6 -
State did violate the injunction, the Eleventh Amendment forbids 
' . 
the d ct from ordering the State to pay retroactive AFDC 
benefits out of the State treasury. 
Appellees concede that probable jurisdiction should be noted 
in No. 86-509 and over question 1 in No. 86-546, but argue that 
the d ct' s order requiring the State to pay retroactive AFDC 
benefits should be summarily affirmed. It is clear that the 
State in fact violated that injunction, which by its precise 
terms forbid what the State did pursuant to the regulations it 
promulgated to implement §602(a) (38). Nor is the State's 
failure to seek to have the injunction lifted justified by the 
passage of §602(a) (38). Cf., e.g., Walker v. City of 
Birmingham, 388 u.s. 307, 314 (1967). Thus, the only question 
is whether the Eleventh Amendment permits federal courts to 
punish violations of injunctions by requiring the State to 
compensate those whom the State injures through its violation of 
the injunction. Hutto v. Finney, 437 u.s. 678, 691 (1978), 
expressly holds that the Eleventh Amendment does. 
The State's response attempts to distinguish Hutto on the 
ground that it involved an award of bad-faith attorneys' fees, 
not retroactive relief. 
4. DISCUSSION: The Court clearly should note probable 
jurisdiction in No. 86-509 and over question 1 in No. 86-564. 
The questions of the constitutionality of §602(a) (38) and the 
statutory validity of the regulations HHS and state agencies 
have promulgated to implement it are being intensively litigated 
~-------------------------~) in the lower courts. By the govt' s count, the govt has ----
- 7 -
prevailed in d ct, either on the merits or on motion for 
preliminary injunction, in eleven such suits; at least one other 
~
d ct has held §602(a) (38) to be unconstitutional; and seven -
other d cts have relied upon statutory grounds to invalidate 
~-----------------------------------------------------~ state and federal regulations adopted to implement §602(a) (38). 
(Appellees' count of the decisions below is somewhat different, 
but the details hardly matter.) Although there are some obvious 
difficulties in the analysis relied upon by the d ct below, in 
light of the importance of the questions presented and the deep 
divisions among the lower courts that have heard the question, I 
don't believe that summary d~s~ition would be appropriate. 
The State's challenge in ~o. 86-564 to the validity of the d 
ct's order that the State pay retroactive AFDC benefits as a 
sanction for violating the 1971 injunction is a different 
matter. I find appellees' argument that this part of the 
judgment is correct to be pretty persuasive. 
' l ' 
I think that the 
State in fact violated the 1971 injunction, that the State's 
---------~-----------~------------------failure to seek to have the injunction lifted was not justified 
by the passage of §602(a) (38), and that the Eleventh Amendment 
permits federal courts to punish violations of injunctions by 
requiring the State to compensate those whom the State injures 
through its violation of the injunction. Nevertheless, I'm not 
sure that the question is so clear that summary affirmance would 
be appropriate. In any event, if the Court were convinced that 
this part of the d ct's decision was correct, it could limit 
briefing to the other q~ions raised by the parties. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: Note probable jurisdiction in Nos. 86-
- 8 -
509 and 86-564. 
There is a response and a reply from the State appellants. 
IFP status of the appellees appears proper. 
November 26, 1986 McLeese Opn in petn 
rjm 11/28/86 
tr. ~~ ~k~~ . 
~~~I@ a_~ 
SUPPLEMENT TO POOL MEMORANDUM 
To: Justice Powell November 28, 1986 
From: Ronald 
Nos. 86-509, Bowen v. Gilliard; -564, Kirk v. Gilliard 
This is the rare case that deserves to be in the appel-
late jurisdiction. 
v 
The de declared a congressional statute un-
constitutional. This is not the only court to find the statute 
unconstitutional, but other courts have found the statute consti-
tutional. The decision below is almost certainly wrong, but in 
light of the conflicting holdings in the lower courts, summary 
reversal is probably inappropriate. Thus, you clearly should 
note No. 86-509, and question 1 in No. 86-564. 
Question 2 in 86-564 is entirel~ separate. 
cials had im~ar program in 1971. 
L.. 
The NC offi-
At that time, 
WDNC enjoined the program, because it conflicted with the then 
existing federal statute. When the new statute was passed, NC 
officials acted immediately to implement it, without having the 
injunction lifted. The~ held that the Eleventh Amendment did 
not bar it from ordering NC officials to pay retroactively for 
the benefits they withheld in reliance on the new 
ute; they should have had the injunction lifted. 
federal stat-
V 
The pool memo 
writer thinks this is correct, but close enough to recommend no-
tation of jurisdiction. I cannot believe this is correct. Con-
------------------~'- ~ 
sidering the complexity of the area, summary disposition is al-
most certainly inappropriate. Thus, although this question 
presents a rather unusual fact situation, I recommend that you 
note jurisdiction over the question. 
I recommend that you note both cases in the entirety. 
December 5, 1986 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Justice Powell April 6, 1987 
From: Leslie 
No. 86-509, 564, Bowen/Kirk v. Gilliard 
Cert. to DC (W.D. N.C.) (McMillan, J.) 
Wednesday, April 22, 1987 (second argument) 
I. Summary 
The questions presented in this case are: (1) 
whether a federal statutory provision that requires that the 
support payments made to a child iri a family in which other 
children receive AFDC payments be included in the total fam-
ily income for purposes of ·calculating the total AFDC pay-
ments for the family is unconstitutional as a taking of the 
child's property or a violation of the Due Process Clause or 
Equal Protection Clause; and ( 2) whether . the Eleventh Amend-
J 
1:'" -J-
ment bars the DC's order that the state petrs make retroac-
tive payments to resps. 
II. Background 
The DC previously enjoined the state petrs from re-
ducing or withholding "the payment of AFDC benefits ... be-
cause of the presumed availability to an AFDC family of 
[child] support payments which belong to one or more but not 
---/ 
all members of that family." Gilliard v. Craig, 331 F. 
Supp. 587, 593-594 (W.D.N.C. 1971). That decision was ap-
pealed to this Court and was affirmed. 409 u.s. 807 (1972). 
The ~971 injunction remains in effect. Resps in this case 
are members of the same class that was granted relief in 
1971 -- that is, children of low income mothers who brought 
= 
suit through their mothers. They filed suit seeking the 
same sort of relief that was granted in 1971. 
This new suit is occasioned by new regulations pro-
mulgated by the state petrs. These regulations define a 
"Stan~ard Filing Unit" for AFDC benefits as follows: 
A. The parent and all minor children who are 
brothers and sisters, including half-brothers and 
sisters, and who qre living toget~er must be in-
cluded in the same •lassis'"E""ance unit~unless: 
1. The parent or child is an SSI [social security 
be~ts] recipient, ~ 
2. The parent or child does not meet all eligi-
bility factors with the exception of income and 
reserve. Do not exclude a parent or child because 
of the amount of income or reserve he has. 
1985 State AFDC Manual §2360 III A. The "assistance unit" 
is used to calculate the AFDC benefits. to be paid to its 
members. The income of all members of the assistance unit 
is counted as available to the whole u 'nit. 
7 
State regula-
tions require that the caretaker of the members of an AFDC 
filing unit assign to the state any rights to support owed 
or paid on behalf of any members of the filing unit. 
The state claims that the new regulations were re-
quired by a new federal enactment, 42 u.s.c. §602(a)(38), a 
part of the 1984 Deficit Reduction Act (DEFRA). This sec-
tion provides that a state AFDC plan must include the income 
available to all dependent children in a filing unit in cal-
cula~ing the amount of AFDC payments to which the unit is 
~ 
entitled. This section of the DEFRA provides that the first ? 
" $50 of any child support payments received in each month by 
any dependent child shall be disregarded in making the cal-
culation. 
Resps claimed that application of the new state reg-
ulation so as to reduce AFDC payments to families in which 
children receive child support payments viola ted the terms 
of the 1971 injunction. The state claims that there is no 
violation because of the operation of federal law. The 
state filed a third-party complaint against the federal -
petrs for contribution if the DC required the payment of 
additional benefits. 
The DC first interpreted the language and leg isla- L) c:::._ 
tive history of the federal statute and determined that the !Jk' ~~ 
federal requirement that child support payments be including 
in the resources of an AFDC filing unit . preempted any state 
law to the contrary. The DC then addressed the consti tu-
r -
tiona! implications of this interpretation. 
....... 
The court con-
eluded that the requirement that an AFDC applicant assign 
L(_ 
J l 
child support income to the state effected a taking of the 
child's property without just compensation because it denied 
the child unrestricted access to his own child support 
funds. The taking occurs because children who receive child 
support payments are required "to contribute a significant 
portion of their income to the state in the name of their 
needy half-siblings in order to reduce state and federal 
AFDC expenditures." Pet. App. 68a-69a. The forced assign-
ment constitutes "an unconstitutional tax on the supported 
child's membership in a particular type of family unit." 
Id., at 61a, 74a. 
The DC next found that the filing unit provision 
violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. The 
court did not apply the usual rational basis test, but in-
stead . determined that "[t]he impact of [Congress'] action on 
the child's fundamental associational rights and on a prop-
erty right requires a more rigorous examination." Id., at /.1~+ 
J:::::. ~ ~- ) 
SSa. The court found that the statute burdened family rela- ~~~-
tionships. It concluded, "The Constitution's consistent 
recognition and protection of family associational rights 
prevent the state and federal governments from using chil-
dren' s unchosen membership in a· family that includes AFDC 
dependent half-sisters and brothers as the justification for 
the deprivation of property." Id., at 8.9a. In a clarifying 
. - · -;;) -
order, the DC indicated that the deprivation of property 
based on a child's unchosen family mem~ership violates due 
process and equal protection principles. The DC enjoined 
the Federal Government from requiring the states to include 
child support resources in the AFDC payment calculation. 
The DC denied a motion for rehearing based on this Court's 
decision in~ v. Castillo, 106 S. Ct. 2727 (1986), dis-
tinguishing this decision on the ground that the AFDC stat-
ute penalizes persons "who are not free to change their liv-
ing arrangements to preserve or augment their income" and 
find~ng the statute as confronting children with the choice 
"between parental relationships and financial survival." 
Id., at 109a. 
III. Analysis 
A. Statutory Construction 
Resps argue that the federal statute is reasonably 
susceptible of two interpretations. One interpretation is 
that ~ongress did not intend to override state domestic re-
lations law and require unwilling children to assign their 
child support payments to the state. Because of the serious 
constitutional questions raised, resps argue that this Court 
should adopt a limiting construction of the statute. Resps' 
~~ 
argument is strained. First, the Secretary of HHS has in-
terpreted the statute to mean that "an application with re-
spect to a dependent child must · also include, if living in 
the same household and otherwise eligible for assistance: 
[a]ny blood-related or adoptive brother or sister." 45 
CFR §206.10(a) (!)(vii) (B). The agency's interpretation of 
the statute it is charged with administering, if reasonable, 
is entitled to deference. the language of the stat-
-----. 
ute itself provides that the children that must be included 
---r 
in an AFDC filing are those "deprived of parental support or 
care." Resps' argument that children who receive child sup-
port payments are not deprived of support fails to recognize 
that they are deprived of care, and the two words are listed 
in the disjunctive in the statute. Most telling is that 
Congress specifically exempted the first $50 of any child - -- --------- \.._.. 
suppqrt payment from inclusion in the AFDC calculation. The 
purpose was to "end the present practice whereby families 
exclude members with income in order to maximize family 
benefits, and [to] ensure that the income of families that 
live together and share expenses is recognized and counted 
as available to the family as a whole." s. Rep. No. 98-169. 
Congress also specifically provided that the social security 
benefits of disabled children is to be excluded from the 
AFDC determination. Thus, all indications are that Congress 
intended child support income to be included in an AFDC ap-
plication. _---.. Where the statute and legislative history are 
clear, there is no room for adopting a limiting construction 
of the statute, even if it were necessary to avoid reaching 
constitutional issues, as resps suggest. 
B. Takings · clause 
The SG is correct that resps' argument, and the DC's 








taking is difficult to address. The DC found that under 
North Carolina law the child support payments are the pri-
vate property of the child, and that the child has a right 
to receive the full amount of the support payments for his 
exclusive use. The DC's theory is that a child's caretaker 
~ bC:3 acts as his trustee in administering the child support pay-
ments for the child's exclusive use, and that the state as-~~ 
signment provision "takes" the property and reassigns it for 
the mutual use of all members of the household. Thus, "[a]s 
a result of the ... regulations, a child previously entitled 
to cnild support has lost the right to enforce the fiduciary 
obligation that prohibited the mother from spending the mon-
ey on anyone other than the designated child." Juris. App. 
A-55. The court observed that the right to exclude others 
is generally "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle 
of rights commonly characterized as property." Kaiser Aetna 
v. United States, 444 u.s. 164, 176 (1979). It found that 
the state and federal governments had destroyed the value of 
this right. Moreover, it destroyed this right on the basis 
of the composition of the child's family, a basis it found 
constitutionally impermissible. 
The DC's reading of North Carolina law appears undu-- --ly strict, as pointed out by the state. While child support 
-----
payments are for the benefit of the child, the mother re-
tains discretion as to how to use the money to "benefit" the 
child. The AFDC program gives the mother the option of 
pooling the family resources to benefit all children, in-
page o. 
eluding the children receiving child support payments. It 
is difficult to say that giving a mother ' this option "takes" 
the child's property in a constitutional sense. There is no 
L I oJ.. 
strong reason why child support payments should be treated 
differently than any other income that a child might have. 
A holding that all independent income of family members 
should be exempt from disclosure would subvert the purpose 
of the government aid program that is to aid the truly 
needy. The logical result of the DC's holding would be that 
the government must calculate each individual's need sepa-
rate~y for government aid programs in order to avoid "tak-
~~?1.-dK-~ 
ing" the property of other individuals. This cannot be cor-
rect. 
These considerations analyzed under the traditional 
takings test indicate that considering the child support 
payments of family members is not a taking. First, the 
character of the government action is a voluntary government 
aid p~ogram. While it may be true that the child does not 
choose to participate, his guardian does. Second, the ef-
feet of the government action is to return the child support 
money to the child in the altered form of AFDC payments. To 
a significant extent, the child still obtains the full bene-
fit of the funds. Third, the inte rfe renee with reasonable 
investment-backed expectations is reduced because a child, 
as a minor, does not really have complete control over his 
child support payments. There is discretion with the guard-
ian to use to money in his best interest~, which may reason-
ably include pooling the money for the use of the family 
unit. 
The SG also maintains that the fact that the money -
is returned to the child in the form of AFDC payments con-
stitutes just compensation. Moreover, when child support 
payments are assigned to the state, the state assumes the 
burden of nonpayment. Finally, the $50 exemption for the 
payments provides significant compensation. 
B. Due Process/Equal Protection Clause 
Just last term, this Court decided ~ v. Castillo. 
The question presented in that case was whether the federal 
food stamp statute that treats parents, 
,..,...... A. ;:;:;;,._ &.1 
children and sib-
lings who live together as a single "household" but applies 
a different standard to more distant relatives and 
nonrelated persons who live together violated the Due Proc-
ess or Equal Protection Clause. The Court found that the DC 
erred in that case in applying a "heightened scrutiny" 
standard. It found that "[c]lose relatives are not a 'sus---
pect' or 'quasi-suspect' class." 106 s. Ct., at 2729. It 
also found that "the statutory classification [did not] 'di-
rectly and substantially' interfere with family living ar-
rangements and thereby burden a fundamental right." Ibid. 
(citation omitted). The "household" definition did not 
order or prevent any group of persons from dining together. 
Under the rational basis test, the classification was proper 
as a reasonable reflection of family practices and an effort 
to prevent fraud. It noted that "the ~est-ineffectiveness 
of case-by-case verification of claims that individuals ate 
as separate households unquestionably warrants the use of 
general definitions in this area." Id., at 2730-2731. The 
Court concluded that Congress could rationally determine 
that the two groups -- close and distant family -- warranted 
different treatment. 
In ruling on the motion · for rehearing, the DC dis-
tinguished ~· First, it found that ~ concerned dimi-
nution of a government benefit. Here, the diminution is of 
the child support payments, which are not a government bene-
fit. Second, it found the deprivation in this case to be 
more severe than in ~· It noted that this case is closer 
to United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 
U.S. 528 (1973) where the definition of a family eligible 
for food stamps completely disqualified families that failed 
to meet the definition. Third, the court found the provi-
sion at issue unacceptable because it penalized children who 
were not free to change their living arrangements. 
The order does not directly address the scrutiny to 
be applied to the classification at issue. In light of 
~' it appears that the DC's use of "heightened scrutiny" 
is wrong. Under the rational basis standard, this classifi-
cation appears to pass muster. The legislative history in-
dicates that Congress was faced with a need to reduce bene-
fit payments. It chose to recognize the reality that family 
members who live together derive benefits because of the 
association and frequently pool resourc~s. The judgment to 
page .l.l. 
include all income of all family members appears to be a 
rational at tempt to direct scarce resources at the truly 
needy. The "burden" on the family members' ability to live 
together appears very similar to that in ~· While it is 
conceivable that the AFDC provision may affect some living 
arrangements, it is practically unlikely and not significant 
enough to violate the Constitution. 
C. Eleventh Amendment 
The DC ordered the state to pay all retroactive -
benefits to which the resps would have been entitled but for 
the new filing provision, and to pay back all child support 
payments assigned to the state. On the merits, the state 
petrs argue that this order for retroactive payment is erro-
neous~ The DC based the payment on the state's violation of 
the preexisting injunction. In 1971, petrs were 
restrained and enjoined from directly or indirect-
ly reducing, or continuing to reduce, withholding, 
or continuing to withhold, the payment to AFDC 
beneficiaries of any funds on the basis of credit-
~ng outside income of one or more members of the 
family group without first determining that such 
income is legally available to all members of the 
family group. 
Payments based on the violation of a preexisting legal duty ~~ 
(the injunction) would not contravene the Eleventh Amend-
ment. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 . (1974); 
Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). 
1...4--
Hutto v. 
Petrs first claim that the DC erroneously interpret-
A 
ed the injunction to require payment regardless of a later 
amendment of the Social Security Act. .There is no mention 
r-:1- --· 
in the injunction that it is based on an interpretation of 
the Act. Moreover, since the same ju'dge interpreted the 
injunction as ordered it, this argument is not particularly 
--- ~
strong. This Court is now faced with a finding by the lower 
court that the state violated its preexisting injunction. 
Arguably, this violation is independent of the validity of 7 
the DC'S conclusion that the new federal law is unconstitu-
tiona!. 
Petrs next claim that the 1971 injunction was based 
on an interpretation of the Social Security Act. When Con-
gres~ amended the Act in 1984, petrs contend, the injunction 
was amended by operation of law. Therefore, petrs never 
violated the injunction. The problem is that the state 
should have asked for a modification of the injunction. In-
stead, the state went ahead and violated the injunction re-
lying on its interpretation of a change in federal law. One 
way to analyze this problem is to read the state requirement 
of "d~termining whether such income is legally available to 
other members of the family group" as referring to a possi-
ble change in the law. The 1984 DEFRA amendment could be 
seen to make the child support payments "legally available" 
to the state. Thus, the state did not violate the terms of 
the injunction. To adopt this interpretation of the injunc-
tion, however, the Court would have to find the DC's inter-
pretation of the injunction clearly erroneous. The Court 
may hesitate to do this. 
r--:~- - --
Another way to analyze this question is to find that -this 
motion to compel adherence to the 1971 injunction. The DC's 
decision was that the new federal statute and state regula-
tions are unconstitutional. The DC does not have authority 
on the basis for this decision to award the payment of bene -
fits because such payment would be retroactive. The only 
authority for ordering the payments is the preexisting in-
junction. But a public right established by a court can be 
--------annulled by subs ~nt legisla 'on and should not thereafter 
be er:tforced. Hodges v. Snyder, 61 u.s. 600, 603 (1923). 
Thus, the su tantive law ena ed by Congress would appear 
to trump the determ111Cl't:1on of the DC as to how the state 
should compute AFDC benefits. Nevertheless, a countervail-
ing principle is that "outstanding injunctive orders of 
----. 
courts be obeyed until modified or reversed by a court hav-
ing the authority to do so ... even though the constitution-
ality . of the Act under which the injunction issued is chal-
lenged, disobedience of such an outstanding order of a fed-
eral court subjects the violator to contempt even though his 
constitutional claim might be later upheld." Pasadena City 
Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 u.s. 424, 439 (1976). The 
state in this case violated an outstanding injunction, and 
thus it appears that it is properly subject to contempt. ~a..-~ 
,- Payment of all back benefits, however, appears to be a par- tYf I'~ 
ticularly severe sanction and a· thinly disguised means of ~~ 
actually awarded retroactive benefits . . The Court may want 
to remand for a determination of an appropriate contempt 
sanction. 
IV. Conclusion 
1. The federal statute is best read to preempt 
state law and require that states include the child support 
payments of all children in a household in the AFDC determi-
nation. 
2. The statute does not constitute a taking of pri- ~f-t::L. 
··~~~ ,, vate property. At most, the statute requires some realloca- . _ -
tion of family income as a condition to participating in a 
volu~tary federal benefit program. 
3 . The statute does not violate the Due Process or 
the Equal 
,.......---
Protection Clause. The proper test is the ra-
tiona! basis test, and the state had a rational basis 
requiring that all income of a household be considering in 
calculating AFDC benefits. 
4. The DC's award of retroactive benefits can be 
modif~ed in two ways. ~ the Court 
~Vt.c.- l&f1( 
injunction incorpora~ed the possibility 
could find that the 
of a change i..t:l--1::he 
~ . . 
law. Under this reading, the state did 
'• 





reading requires that the Court disregard the issuing 
/Su.l-~ 
not violate the in-
court's interpretation of the injunction. ~' the Court ~ .5 ~ 
could find that the DC was empowered to sanction the state ~ 
for contempt, but that it could not enforce the terms of the 
~a<~ 




vu.. a....._ ~ ~,t..u-<-~ 
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era! law. Under this view, the case should be remanded for 
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To: Justice Powell April 23, 1987 
From: Leslie 
No. 86-509, Bowen v. Gilliard 
The best argument for affirming in this case (that is, 
finding the congressional statute respecting child support bene-
fits unconstitutional) is the Due Process Clause. After ~ v. 
Castillo, 106 s. ct. 2727 (1986), it is difficult to argue that 
the burden imposed by the statute should be analyzed under 
"heightened" scrutiny. The Court in ~ found that the statu-
tory classification did not "directly and substantially" inter-
fere with family living arrangements. Here, it appears that the 
burden is more substantial. Children lose significant amounts of 
money by having to share it with their siblings through AFDC pay-
ments. But it is difficult to argue that a burden imposed by a 
page 2. 
voluntary government aid program is "direct." It thus appears 
' -~ ~ __,..... - ........__...., 
that the Court should apply rational basis analysis. This analy-
sis could proceed as follows: 
The DC found that under state law, a child is entitled to 
have child support funds spent only on him. While this state law 
principle may be questionable, this Court normally accepts a 
lower court's interpretation of state law. Congress, in enacting 
the statute at issue, assumed that families pool all funds, in-
eluding child support funds. Thus, Congress assumed that mothers 
are routinely violating the fiduciary duty to use child support 
bene~its only for the support of the particular child. Moreover, 
this congressional classification actually encourages mothers to 
violate state law. For this reason, the classification is irra-
tional. 
(Note that the other side of this issue is that the Court 
could find (as the DC did in the alternative) that the federal 
statute preempts this aspect of state law. Therefore, Congress 
is not forcing mothers to violate their fiduciary obligations to 
the children who receive child support payments, but is redefin-
ing the law of child support. Note also that under this view, 
the Court could find that the state did iolate the terms of 
the injunction and therefore is not required to pay retroactive 
benefits. The injunction required the state to ascertain if mon-
ey was "legally available" before including it in the AFDC calcu-
lation. If the federal statute· preempted this aspect of state 
law, the state could reasonably have found that the child support 
money was legally available.) 
~lsg 04/23/87 
MEMORANDUM 
To: Justice Powell April 23, 1987 
From: Leslie 
No. 86-509, Bowen v. Gilliard 
In the previous memo, I discussed whether the burden of 
the federal statute is "direct" within the meaning of ~ v. 
Castillo, 106 s. Ct. 2727 (1986). The burden is not "direct" as 
in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), where a 
statute prohibited nonrelatives from living together. There is 
no direct prohibition in this case. 
'T( - ,r 
a voluntary statute. 
The burden is a condition to ---:::::::.. --==-- '-
It could be argued, however, that the bur-
den is more direct here than in other voluntary aid cases because 
of the minor status of the child~ He is faced with the choice of 
living with his mother and siblings and sharing his child sup-
-port, or moving ·out of the house in orde~ to retain the full ben-
page 2. 
efit of the money. It could be argued that the resps in ~ had 
more real choice because they usually were not minors. It could 
also be argued that the relationship of mother to child is more 
"fundamental" and so a burden on the relationship is less tolera-
ble. The real issue seems to be whether Congress can make the 
legislative judgment that child support payments are being used, 
and can be used, to support an entire family as opposed to the 
particular child. If you want to find that this judgment is ir-
rational, and burdens a child's fundamental right to choose his 
living arrangements, a reasoned opinion can be written. 
~· 86-509 Bowen·. v. Gilliard r Conf. 4/24/87 
, ~o. ·----------------------~ 
' 
Justiee White 
( S"..-CA. /S~·s ~~ ~' ~ 
- ~.:._r~) 
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CHAMeERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
April 30, 1987 
Re: 86-509 - Bowen v. Gilliard 
86-564 - Kirk v. Gilliard 
Dear Chief: 
After further reflection, I have decided to vote 
to reverse in these cases. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
Respectfully, 
· ~ I 
tJ u~~..u.;c .l.ua...:;n.utuu 
Justice Powell ~ /1 ;0 
Justice O'Connor ~ .J. (f 
Justice Scalia 
From: Justice Stevens 
Circulated: __ .J_U_N __ ~----'-1 8-"-ti'--/ __ 
Recirculated: _____ ___ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
NOS. 86-509 AND 86-564 
OTIS R. BOWEN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVICES, PETITIONER 
86-509 v. 
/~ 
BEATY MAE GILLIARD ET AL. ~· 
fY Lt DAVID T. FLAHERTY, SECRETARY, NORTH 
/LY CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
'! l v-, ~"' \ BG-SS4 RESOURCES, ET ~L., APPELLANTS 
Co,/ ~ ' BEATY MAE GILLIARD ET AL. 
fr:./ ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
( vv THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
[June-, 1987] 
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
As part of its major effort to reduce the federal deficit 
through The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 494, Con-
gress amended the statute authorizing Federal Aid to Fam-
ilies with Dependent Children (AFDC) 1 to require that a 
family's eligibility for benefits must take into account, with 
certain specified exceptions, the income of all parents, broth-
1 "'The AFDC program is based on a scheme of cooperative federalism.' 
King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 316 (1968). Established by Title IV of the 
Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 627, 'to provide financial assistance to 
needy dependent children and the parents or relatives who live with and 
care for them,' Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U. S. 251, 253 (1974), the federal 
program reimburses each state which chooses to participate with a per-
centage of the funds it expends. § 403, 42 U. S. C. § 603. In return , the 
State must administer its assistance program pursuant to applicable fed-
eral statutes and regulations. § 402, 42 U. S. C. § 602.'' Heckler v. 
Turner, 470 U. S. 184, 189 (1985). 
86-509 & 86-564-0PINION 
2 BOWEN v. GILLIARD 
ers and sisters living in the same home. 2 The principal 
question presented in this appeal is whether that require- f-.. J 
rrient violates the Fifth Amendment to the United States :;J 
Constitu Ion w en it IS app Ie to require a family wishing to 
receive AF~elitS' o mclu_~~--~~Ta1hi!Q_for 
whom c I1a support payments are being made by a noncus-
to Ial parent. 
2 The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 494, which fills over 700 
pages of the statutes at large, includes two major divisions, the Tax Re-
form Act of 1984 and the Spending Reduction Act of 1984. The amend-
ment at issue in this case is found in the latter division, 98 Stat. 1145. As 
a result of that . amendment, § 402(a)(38) of the Social Security Act, 42 
U. S. C. (Supp. III) 602(a)(38) now provides, in pertinent part: 
"A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must-
* "' "' 
''provide that in making the determination under paragraph (7) with re-
spect to a dependent child and applying paragraph (8), the State agency 
shall (except as otherwise provided in this part) include-
"(A) any parent of such child, and 
"(B) any brother or sister of such child, if such brother or sister meets 
the conditions described in clauses (1) and (2) of section 606(a) of this title, 
if such parent, brother, or sister is living in the same home as the depend-
ent child, and any income of or available for such parent, brother, or sister 
shall be included in making such determination and applying such para-
graph with respect to the family (notwithstanding section 405(j) of this 
title, in the case of benefits provided under subchapter II of this 
chapter) .... " 
Section 406(a), in turn, provides: 
"The term 'dependent child' means a needy child (1) who has been deprived 
of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from 
the home ... or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living 
with his father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfa-
ther, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, 
nephew, or niece, in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such 
relatives as his or her own home, and (2) who is (A) under the age of eigh-
teen, or (B) at the option of the State, under the age of nineteen and a full-
time student in a secondary school (or in the equivalent level of vocational 
or technical training), if before he attains age nineteen, he may reasonably 
be expected to complete the program of such secondary school (or such 
training)." 42 U. S. C. § 606(a). 
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I 
This litigation began in 1970. At that time the federal 
statute did not require that all parents and siblings be in-
cluded in an AFDC filing unit. Thus, for example, if a teen- · 
age child had significant income of her own, perhaps from 
wages or perhaps in support payments from an absent par-
ent, the other members of her family could exclude her from 
the filing unit in order to avoid disqualifying the entire family 
from benefits or reducing its level of benefits. 
Beaty Mae Gilliard, one of the named class members in the 
1970 suit, 3 began receiving public assistance from North Car-
olina under AFDC in 1962. In February 1970, after her sev-
enth child was born, the State automatically included him in 
the filing unit, thereby increasing the family's monthly allot-
ment from $217 to $227 to reflect the difference between the 
benefit for a family of seven and the benefit for a family of 
eight. Gilliard was, however, also receiving $43.33 each 
month in child support from the baby's father. When a for-
mal parental support order was entered in April 1970, the 
State credited the support payments against her account and 
reduced her monthly benefit to $184. Gilliard sued, contend-
ing that she had a statutory right to exclude her seventh child 
from the unit and thus to continue to receive the $217 benefit 
for a family of seven and also to retain the $43.33 paid by her 
youngest child's father. A three-judge District Court 
agreed with her reading of the statute and entered an order 
requiring the State to reinstate her benefits at the $217 level 
and to reimburse her for the improper credits of $43 per 
month. Gilliard v. Craig, 331 F . Supp. 587 (WDNC 1971). 
The District Court also granted class-wide relief. We af-
3 The class was comprised of "persons who have been or may be subject 
to reduction of AFDC . . . benefits based upon unconstitutional or illegal 
claim of credit by administering agencies for outside income and other re-
sources available to some but not all of a family group." Gilliard v. Craig, 
331 F . Supp. 587, 588 (WDNC 1971). 
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firmed that judgment. 409 U. S. 807 (1972). No constitu-
tional question was decided at that time. 
Congress amended the AFDC program in 1975 to require, 
as a condition of eligibility, that applicants for assistance 
must assign to the State any right to receive child support 
payments for any member of the family included in the filing 
unit. 4 In response, North Carolina amended its laws to pro-
vide that the acceptance of public assistance on behalf of a 
dependent child would constitute an assignment of any right 
to support for that child. SeeN. C. G. S. § 110-37. These 
amendments, however, did not harm recipients like Gilliard 
because they did not affect the right to define the family unit 
covered by an application and thereby to exclude children 
with independent income, such as a child for whom support 
payments were being made. 
In 1983, the Secretary of Health and Human Services pro-
posed certain amendments to the Social Security Act to "as-
sure that limited Federal and State resources are spent as 
effectively as possible." Letter of 25 May 1983, to the Hon-
orable George Bush, President of the Senate, App. 168-169 
(hereinafter Heckler Letter). One of the Secretary's pro-
posals was "to establish uniform rules on the family members 
who must file together for AFDC, and the situations in which 
'Section 402(a)(26)(A) provides: 
"As a condition of eligibility for aid, each applicant or recipient will be 
required-
"(A) to assign to the State any rights to support from any other person 
such applicant may have (i) in his own behalf or in behalf of any other fam-
ily member for whom the applicant is applying for or receiving aid, and (ii) 
which have accrued at the time such assignment is executed, .... " 42 
U. S. C. § 602(A)(26)(A). 
The 1975 amendment also amended § 402 to require recipients to: 
"cooperate with the State (i) in establishing the paternity of a child born 
out of wedlock with respect to whom aid is claimed, and (ii) in obtaining 
support payments for such applicant and for a child with respect to whom 
such aid is claimed, or in obtaining any other other payments or property 
due such applicant or such child .... " 42 U. S. C. § 602 (A)(26)(B). 
86-509 & 86-564-0PINION 
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income must be counted. In general, the parents, sisters, 
and brothers living together with a dependent child must all 
be included; the option of excluding a sibling with income, for 
example, would no longer be avai~able." Ibid. The Secre-
tary stressed that the improvements would result in an 
AFDC allocation program that "much more realistically re-
flects the actual home situation." Id., at 169. 
The Secretary's proposal was not enacted in 1983, but one 
of the provisions in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 
(DEFRA) established a standard filing unit for the AFDC 
program. The ~mee estimated that 
the change would save $455,000,000 during the next three fis-
cal years. S. Rpt. No. 98-169, Deficit Reduction Act of 
1984, Explanation of Provisions Approved by Committee on 
3/21184, 980 (Comm. Print 1984) (hereinafter Senate Report). 
It explained the purpose of the amendment in language that 
removes any possible ambiguity in the relevant text of the 
statute: 5 
Present Law 
"There is no requirement in present law that parents 
and all siblings be included in the AFDC filing unit. 
Families applying for assistance may exclude from the 
filing unit certain family members who have income 
which might reduce the family benefit. For example, a 
family might choose to exclude a child who is receiving 
Social Security payments, if the payments would reduce 
• In support of the District Court's judgment, appellees have asked us to 
adopt a construction of the statute that is completely inconsistent with the 
intent of Congress as explained in the Secretary's request for the legisla-
tion, in the Senate Report, and in the Conference Report as well. More-
over, the arguments are inconsistent with the unambiguous regulations the 
Secretary has adopted to implement the statute. See 45 CFR 206.10(a)(1) 
(vii). The District Court carefully considered these statutory arguments 
and rejected them. 633 F. Supp. 1529, 1548. We agree with that court's 
analysis of the meaning of the statute and find no merit in appellees' statu-
tory arguments advanced in this Court. See also Gorrie v. Bowen, 809 F. 
2d 508, 513-516 (CA8 1987). 
6 
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the family's benefits by an amount greater than the 
amount payable on behalf of the child. 
Explanation of Provision 
"The provision approved by the Committee would re-
quire States to include in the filing unit the parents and 
all dependent minor siblings (except SSI recipients and 
any stepbrothers and stepsisters) living with a child who 
applies for or receives AFDC. * * * 
"This change will end the present practice whereby 
families exclude members with income in order to maxi-
mize family benefits, and will ensure that the income of 
family members who live together and share expenses is 
recognized and counted as available to the family as a 
whole." Senate Report 980. 
See also H. Conf. Rep. No. 98-861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1407 
(1984). 
Because the 1984 amendment forced families to include in 
the~hAc!I".en or w om support payments were 
being received, tlie practical effect was that many families' 
total income was reduced. 6 "'rlie burden of tEe change was 
mitig~y a separate amendment providing that 
the first $50 of child support collected by the State must be 
remitte to t e am1 y an ng__ counted as income for the pur-
pose of determining its benefit 1evel. 7 See 42 U. S. C. 
(Supp. III) § 602(a)(8)(A)(vi); 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III) 
'For example, under the July 1985levels of payment in North Carolina, 
a family of four with no other income would have received $269. A child's 
support income of $100 would therefore reduce the family's AFDC pay-
ment to $169 if that child was included in the filing unit. The family would 
have a net income of$269. But if the family were permitted to exclude the 
child from the unit and only claim the somewhat smaller benefit of $246 for 
a family of three, it could have collected that amount plus the excepted 
child's $100 and have a net income of $346. See App. 85. 
7 Therefore, under our example, n. 6, supra, the net income with the . 
child included in the unit would have been $319. 
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§ 657(b)(l). Thus, the net effect of the 1984 Amendments for 
a family comparable to Gilliard's would include three changes: 
(1) the addition of the child receiving support would enlarge 
the filing unit and entitle the family to a somewhat larger 
benefit; (2) child support would be treated as ~mily income 
and would be assigned 'to the State, thereby reaucing the 
AFDC benefits by that amount; and (3) the reduction would 
be offset by $50 if that amount was collected from an absent 
parent. In sum, if the assigned support exceeded $50 plus 
the difference in the benefit level caused by adding the child 
or children receiving support, the family would suffer; if less 
than $50 and the difference in the benefit level was collected 
as support, it would not. 
II 
After North Carolina adopted regulations to comply with 
the 1984 Amendments, some members of the class that had 
earlier obtained relief filed a motion to reopen the 1971 de-
cree and obtain further relief on behalf of the class. The 
S~e-~~ the Secretary of Health and Human SerV-
ices,contending that if the State's compliance with the fed-
eral statute resulted in any liability to appellees, the Federal 
Government should share in any payment of additional 
AFDC benefits. The District Court found that North Caro-
lina's and the Departmenr-or--Realth and Human Services' 
regulations were in conformance with the statute, 8 but con-
s The Secretary of Health and Human Resources promulgated the fol-
lowing regulation to implement the DEFRA amendment: 
"For AFDC purposes only, in order for the family to be eligible, an appli-
cation with respect to a dependent child must also include, if living in the 
same household and otherwise eligible for assistance: 
(A) Any natural or adoptive parent, or stepparent (in the case of States 
with general applicability); and 
(B) Any blood-related or adoptive brother or sister." 45 CFR 206.10 
(a)(l)(vii). 
North Carolina's implementing regulations are set forth in the District 
Court's opinion. 633 F. Supp., at 1533-1534. 
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eluded that the statutory scheme violated both the Due Proc- J ').V,j- fJAvul1~ 
ess Clause and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 9 
The court interpreted North Carolina law as imposing a 
duty on the mother to use child support money exclusively 
for the benefit of the child for whom it had been obtained, 10 
and reasoned that a forced assignment of the support money 
to the State in exchange for AFDC benefits for the entire 
family was a taki _of the child's rivate ro erty. 633 F. 
Supp. 1529, 1551-1555 (1986 . Additionally, the court rea-
soned that the use of the child's support money to reduce the 
Governm~t's AFDC expenditures was tantamount to pun-
ishing fJ(the child for exercising the fundamental right to live 
with his or her family. !d., at 1557. Because of the serious 
impact on the autonomy of the family-including the child's 
potential relationship with his or her natural father-"special f) L 
~ was considered appropriate, id., at 
1555-1557, and the deprivation of property and liberty 
effected by the statutory scheme could not, in the court's 
view, survive such scrutiny. We noted probable jurisdic-
tion, 479 U. S.- (1986). 
9 "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
ithout just compensation." U. S. Const. Arndt. 5. 
10 The District Court relied on the following paragraph of the opinion of 
the North Carolina Supreme Court in Goodyear v. Goodyear, 257 N. C. 
374, 379, 126 S. E. 2d 113, 117 (1962): 
"While defendant [father] was and is obligated to make the monthly pay-
ments called for in his. contract for the support of his children, plaintiff 
[mother] is not the beneficiary of the moneys which defendant must pay. 
These moneys belong to the children. Plaintiff is a mere trustee for them. 
That part of the payments not reasonably necessary for support and main-
tenance, she must hold for the benefit of the children and account to them 
when they call upon her. She cannot, by contract with another person, 
profit at the expense of the children." 
The Goodyear opinion did not purport to announce any rule of law unique 
to North Carolina; it quoted from Indiana and Iowa opinions and cited 
authorities from other jurisdictions. 
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The District Court was undoubtedly correct in its percep-
tion that a number of needy families have suffered, and will 
suffer, as a resrut- or the 1mplemen ation of the DEFRA 
amendments to the AFDC program. Such suffering is fre-
quently the tragic by-product of a decision to reduce or to 
modify benefits to a Class of neem reC! Ient~U nder our 
structure of government, however, 1 1s the function of Con-
gress-not the courts-to determine whether the savings re-
alized, and presumably used for other critical governmental 
..-----r functions, are significant enough to justify the costs to the in-
__.- 1 dividuals affected by such reductions. The Fifth Amend-
f.. ment "gives the federal courts no power to impose upon [Con-
~ gress] their views of what constitutes wise economic or social 
~ policy," by telling it how "to reconcile the demands of . . . 
needy citizens with the finite resources available to meet 
those demands." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 
486, 472 (1970). Unless the legislative branch's decisions run 
afoul of some constitutional edict, any inequities created by 
such decisions must be remedied by the democratic proc-
esses. The District Court believed that the amendments at 
issue did conflict with both the Due Process Clause and the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We consider these 
arguments in turn, and reject them. 11 
11 The only Court of Appeals, see Gorrie v. Brown, supra, and virtually 
all o~s;-that have addressed challen es to the'inciusion of 
child SUJ> Ort Or other "exclusive use"fundsli~d the validity of 
these amendments, see e. g. , Showers v. Cohen, 645 F. Supp. 217 (M. D. 
Pa. 1986); Sherrod v. Hegstrom, 629 F. Supp. 150 (D. Or. 1985); Huber v. 
Blinzinger, 626 F. Supp. 30 (N. D. Ind. 1985); Oliver v. Ledbetter, 624 F. 
Supp. 325 (N. D. Ga. 1985); Ardister v. Mansour, 627 F. Supp. 641 (W. D. 
Mich. 1986) (denying preliminary injunction); Shonkwiler v. Heckler, 628 
F. Supp. 1013 (S. D. Ind. 1985) (denying preliminary injunction); Cf. Park 
v. Coler, 143 Ill. App. 3d 727, 493 N. E. 2d 130 (1986); but see Lesko v. 
Bowen, 639 F. Supp. 1152 (ED Wis. 1986), appeal docketed, No. 86-744; 
Baldwin v. Ledbetter, 647 F. Supp. 623 (N. D. Ga. 1986), appeal docketed, 
No. 86-1140, stay pending appeal granted, 479 U. S. - (No. A-448) 
(1986) (POWELL, Circuit Justice). 
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III 
The precepts that govern our review of appellees' due 
process and equal protection challenges to this program are 
similar to those we have applied in reviewing challenges to 
other parts of the Social Security Act: 
"[O]ur ~tial. 'Governmental decisions 
to spend money to improve the general public welfare in 
one way and not another are "not confided to the courts. 
The discretion belongs to Congress unless the choice is 
clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exer-
cise of judgment."' Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 
181, 185 (1976), quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 
619, 640 (1937)." Bowen v. Owens, 476 U. S. -,--
(1986). . 
This standard of review is premised on Congress' "plenary 
power to define the scope and the duration of the entitlement 
to . . . benefits, and to increase, to decrease, or to te·rminate 
those benefits based on its appraisal of the relative impor-
tance of the recipients' needs and the resources available to 
fund the program." Atkins v. Parker, 472 U. S. 115, 129 
(1985); see also Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U. S. 569 (1982); 
Califano v. Boles, 443 U. S. 282, 296 (1979); California v. 
Aznavorian, 439 U. S. 170 (1978); Weingberger v. Salfi, 422 
u. s. 749 (1975). 
The District Court had before it evidence that the DEFRA 
amendments were severely impacting some families. For 
example, some noncustodial parents stopped making their 
support payments because they believed that their payments 
were helping only the State, and not their children. 633 F. 
Supp., at 1542-1543. It is clear, however, that in the ad-
ministration of a fund that is large enough to have a signifi-
cant impact on the Nation's deficit, general rules must be 
examined in light of the broad purposes they are intended to 
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serve. 12 The challenged amendment unquestionably serves 
Congress' goal of decreasing federal expenditures. See Sen-
ate Report 981 (estimating that amendment in AFDC pro-
gram will save $455 million during fiscal years 1984 through 
1987); 130 Cong. Rec. S4099 (remarks of Sen. Dole). The ev-
idence that a few noncustodial parents were willing to violate 
the law by not making court-ordered support payments does 
not alter the fact that the entire program has resulted in 
saving huge sums of money. 
The rationality of the amendment denying a family the J 
right to exclude a supported child from the filing unit is also 
supported by the Government's se arate interest in distrib-
uting bene ts among competing need fami 1es m a fair way. 
Given its perceive nee o make cuts in t e AFDC udget, 
Congress obviously sought to identify a group that would suf-
fer less than others as a result of a reduction in benefits. 
When considering the plight of two five-person families, one 
of which receives no income at all while the other receives 
regular support payments for some of the minor children, it is 
surely reasonable for Congress to conclude that the former is 
in greater need than the latter. This conclusion is amply 
supported by Congress' assumption that child support pay-
ments received are generally beneficial to the entire family 
unit, see Senate Report 980, and by "the common sense prop-
osition that individuals living with others usually have 
reduced per capita costs because many of their expenses are 
shared." Termini v. Califano, 611 F. 2d 367, 370 (CA2 
1979); see also Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U. S. --,-- (1986). 13 
12 "General rules are essential if a fund of this magnitude is to be adminis-
tered with a modicum of efficiency, even though such rules inevitabfy 
produce seemingly arbitrary consequences in some individual cases. 
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 776." California v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 
47, 53 (1977). 
13 An assumption that child support payments to families receiving 
AFDC benefits are typically used for the entire family's needs is entirely 
reasonable. See Senate Report, supra, at 980 (amendment will "ensure 
that the income of family members who live together and share expenses is 
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It was therefore rational for Congress to adjust the AFDC 
program to re ect e fact t at support money genera y pro-
videsslgru can ene ts or en Ire ami y um s. Is con-
clusionisno un ermine by the act at ere are no doubt 
many families in which some-or perhaps all-of the support 
money is spent in a way that does not benefit the rest of the 
family. In determining how best to allocate limited funds 
among the extremely large class of needy families eligible for 
AFDC benefits, Congress is entitled to rely on a class-wide 
presumption that custodial parents have used, and may 
legitimately use, support funds in a way that is beneficial to 
entire family units. As we have repeatedly explained: 
If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does 
not offend the Constitution simply because the classifica-
tion 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because it 
results in some inequality.' Lindsley v. Natural Car-
bonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78. 'The problems of gov-
ernment are practical ones and may justify, if they do 
not require, rough accomodations-illogical, it may be, 
and unscientific.' Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chi-
cago, 228 U. S. 61, 69-70. "A. statutory discrimination 
recognized"). This conclusion does not rest on an assumption that custo-
dial parents routinely violate State law restrictions on the use of support 
money. For the requirement that the support income be used for the 
"benefit" of the child does not preclude its use for common expenses. 
Moreover, the custodial parent's duty to benefit the supported child is not 
necessarily served simply by spending more money on him or her than on 
other children living in the same home. As the District Court recognized, 
nothing in North Carolina law requires a custodial parent to focus only on 
the economic interest of the child receiving support without taking into ac-
count the emotional and psychological welfare of the child. Congress' find-
ing that custodial parents were routinely using the support funds for the 
entire family thus reflects the reality that such use is typically proper since 
expenditures for an entire family unit typically benefit each member of the 
household. We do not question Congress' reliance on the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services' assurance that counting child support income 
as part of the family income "much more realistically reflects the actual 
home situation." Heckler Letter, App. 168-169. 
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will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may 
be conceived to justify it.' McGowan v. Maryland, 366 
U. S. 420, 426." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 
485 (1970). 
See also Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, at 785. We have no 
doubt that the DEFRA amendment satisfies this test. 14 
Appellees argue (and the District Court ruled), however, 
that finding that Congress acted rationally is not enough to 
sustain this legislation. Rather, they claim that some form 
of "heightened scrutiny" is appropriate because the amend-
ment interferes with a family's fundamental right to live in 
the type of family unit it chooses. 15 We conclude that the 
District Court erred in subjecting the DEFRA amendment to 
any form of heightened scrutiny. That some families may 
decide to modify their living arrangements in order to avoid 
the effect of the amendment, does not transform the amend-
ment into an act whose design and direct effect is to "in-
trude[] on choices concerning family living arrangements." 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 499 (1977). 
As was the case with the marriage-related provision upheld 
in Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47 (1978), "Congress adopted 
the rule in the course of constructing a complex social welfare 
14 Congress' presumption is similar to the one made in § 402(a)(31), 42 
U. S. C. § 602(a)(31), which provides that portions of a stepparent's income 
are to be considered as part of the family income for AFDC purposes. In 
Brown v. Heckler, 589 F. Supp. 985 (ED Pa.), affirmed, 760 F. 2d 255 
(CA3 1984), the court explained that the presumption that a stepparent 
will assist in supporting his or her spouse's children is rational, even 
though stepparents are under no legal duty to assist the children, and not 
every stepparent does. See also Kollett v. Harris, 619 F. 2d 134 (CAl 
1980) (holding that inclusion of stepparent's income as available to child in 
the Supplemental Security Income program was not unconstitutionally 
irrational). 
15 For example, the District Court had before it an affidavit from one 
mother who stated that she had sent a child to live with the child's father in 
order to avoid the requirement of including that child, and the support 
received from the child's father, in the AFDC unit. 633 F. Supp., at 
1537-1538. 
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system that necessarily deals with the intimacies of life. 
This is not a case where the Government seeks to foist ortho-
doxy on the unwilling." !d., at 53, n. 11. 
Last Term we rejected a constitutional challenge to a 
~
provision in the Federal Food Stamp Program, which deter-
mines eligibility and benefit levels on a "household" rather 
than an individual basis. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U. S. --
(1986). 16 We held that the ~of equal treatment in 
the due process Clause of the Fifth Amendment was not vio-
lated by the statutory requirement that generally treated 
parents, children, and siblings who lived together as a single 
household, and explained: 
"The disadvantaged class is that comprised by parents, 
children, and siblings. Close relatives are not a 'sus-
pect' or 'quasi-suspect' class. As a historical matter, 
they have not been subjected to discrimination; they do 
not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing charac-
teristics that define them as a discrete group; and they 
are not a minority or politically powerless. See, e. g., 
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 
U . . S. 307, 313-314 (1976) (per curiam). In fact, quite 
the contrary is true. 
"Nor does the statutory classification 'directly and 
substantially' interfere with family living arrangements 
and thereby burden a fundamental right. Zablocki v. 
Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 386-387, and n.12 (1978). See 
id., at 403-404 (STEVENS, J., concurring); Califano v. 
Jobst, 434 U. S. 47, 58 (1977)." 477 U. S., at-. 
In light of this, we concluded in Lyng that the "District Court 
erred in judging the constitutionality of the statutory distinc-
tion under 'heightened scrutiny.'" I d., at --. In this case 
the District Court committed the same error. As in Lyng, 
18 The District Court denied appellants' motion for reconsideration in 
light of our decision in Lyng. App. to Juris. Statement in No. 86-509, 
107a. 
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the standard of review here is whether "Congress had a ra-
tional basis" for its decision. I d., at --. And as in Lyng, 
"the justification for the statutory classification is obvious." 
I d., at --. The provisions at issue do not violate the Due 
Process Clause. 17 
IV 
Aside from holding that the amendment violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and its equal protec-
tion component, The District Court invalidated t~ QEFRA 
amendment as a taking of private P!~~ty without just com-
pensat~msliOiamg on the premise that 
a child for whom support payments are made has a right to 
have the support money used exclusively in his or her "best 
interest." Yet, the court reasoned, the requirements (1) 
that a custodial parent who applies for AFDC must include a 
child's support money in computing family income, and (2) 
that the support must be assigned to the State, effectively 
converts the support funds that were once to be used exclu-
sively for the child's best interests into an AFDC check 
which, under federal law, must be used for the benefit of all 
the children. §405, 42 U.S. C. §605. Therefore, the Dis-
17 Nor is there any merit in the contention that the assignment provision, 
see supra, at 4, and n. 4, violates the Due Process Clause. Once it is de-
termined that it is permissible to include all members of the family in the 
unit, the assignment of the benefits typically has no adverse effect on the 
child receiving support. To the contrary, through the assignment provi-
sion the Government takes over the responsibility of making sure that 
noncustodial parents actually perform their child support obligations. The 
State also bears the risk of non-payment of support, since the family 
receives the identical amount of AFDC (although not the $50 supplement) 
whether or not the absent parent makes payments. In the first ten years 
following the adoption of the assignment requirement in 1975, legal pater-
nity was established for more than 1.5 million children, more than 3.5 mil-
lion support orders were established, and $6.8 billion in support obligations 
was collected on behalf of children in AFDC families. Office of Child Sup-
port Enforcement, U. S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, A Decade of 
Child Support Enforcement 1975-1985: Tenth Annual Report to Congress 
for the Period Ending September 30, 1985, at iii, 6, 9-10 (1985). 
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trict Court held that the state was "taking" that child's right 
to exclusive use of the support mon~In addressing this 
issue, it is helpful to look first at whether the state "takes" 
the child's property when it considers the support payments 
as part of the family's income in computing AFDC eligibility. 
We will then consider whether the requirement that support 
payments be assigned to the State requires a finding that the 
amendments violate the taking prohibition. 
Some perspective on the issue is helpful here. Had no 
AFDC program ever existed until 1984, and had Congress 
then instituted a program that took into account support pay-
ments that a family receives, it is hard to believe that we 
would seriously entertain an argument that the new benefit 
program constituted a taking. Yet, somehow, once benefits 
are in place and Congress sees a need to reduce them in order 
to save money and to distribute limited resources more 
fairly, the "takings:_ label seems to have a bit more plausibil-
ity. For legal purposes t~s are iden-
ticat" See Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Se-
curity Entrapment, 477 U. S. -- (1986). Congress is not, 
by virtue of having instituted a social welfare program, 
bound to continue it at all, much less at the same benefit 
level. Thus, notwithstanding the technical legal arguments 
that have been advanced, it is imperative to recognize that 
the amendment at issue merely incorporates a definitional 
element into an entitlement program. It would be quite 
strange indeed if, by virtue of an offer to provide benefits to 
needy families through the entirely voluntary AFDC pro-
gram, Congress or the States were deemed to have taken 
some of those very family members' property. 
The basic requirement that the AFDC filing unit must in-
clude all family members living in the home, and therefore 
that support payments made on behalf of a member of the 
family must be considered in determining that family's level 
of benefits, does not even arguably take anyone's property. 
The family members other than the child for whom the sup-
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port is being paid certainly have no taking claim, since it is 
clear that they have no protected property rights to contin-
ued benefits at the same level. · See Public Agencies Op-
posed to Social Security Entrapment, supra. Nor does the 
simple inclusion of the support income in the benefit calcula-
tion have any legal effect on the child's right to have it used 
for his or her benefit. To the extent that a child has the 
right to have the support payments used in his "best inter-
est," he or she fully retains that right. Of course, the effect 
of counting the support payments as part of the filing unit's 
income often reduces the family's resources, and hence in-
creases the chances that sharing of the support money will be 
appropriate. See n. 13, supra. But given the unquestioned 
premise that the government has a right to reduce AFDC 
benefits generally, that result does not constitute a taking of 
private property without just compensation. 
The only possible legal basis for appellees' takings claim, 
therefo~ that an applicant for AFDC 
benefits must assign the support payments to the State, 
which then will remit the amount collected to the custodial 
parent to be used for the benefit of the entire family. This 
legal transformation in the status of the funds, the argument 
goes, modifies the the child's interest in the use of the money 
so dramatically that it constitutes a taking of the child's prop-
erty. As a practical matter, this argument places form over 
substance, and labels over reality. Although it is true that 
money which was earmarked for a specific child's or chil-
dren's "best interest" becomes a part of a larger fund avail-
able for all of the children, the difference between these 
concepts is, as we have discussed, more theoretical than 
practical. 18 
18 In analyzing the effect of the assignment it is again instructive to ask 
what would happen to the support payments if there were no AFDC pro-
gram at all. In that case, it would appear that custodial parents would 
have to use a much greater portion of the support payments to sustain the 
family unit, since it could hardly be deemed in the child's best interest for 
86-509 & 86-564-0PINION 
18 BOWEN v. GILLIARD 
In evaluating whether governmental regulation of prop-
erty constitutes a "taking" we have "eschewed the develop-
ment of any set formula ... and have relied instead on ad 
hoc, factual inquiries into the circumstances of each particu-
lar case." Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 
u. s. 211,- (1986). 
To aid in this determination, however, we have identi-
fied three factors which have 'particular significance:' (1) 
'the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant'; 
(2) 'the extent to which the regulation has interfered 
with distinct investment-backed expectations'; and (3) 
'the character of the governmental action.' Penn Cen-
tral Transportation Co., [438 U. S. 104,] 124." Con-
nolly, supra, at--. 
Here, each of these three factors refutes the conclusion that 
th~s been a taking. =-
~in evaluating the economic impact of the assignment, 
it is Important to remember that it is the impact on the child, 
not on the entire family unit, that is relevant. Thus, the fact 
that the entire family's net income may be reduced does not 
necessarily mean that the amount of money spent for the ben-
efit of a supported child will be any less than the amount of 
the noncustodial parent's support payments. The reality is 
that the money will usually continue to be used in the same 
manner that it was previously since the typical AFDC parent 
will have used the support money as part of the general fam-
ily fund even without its being transferred through AFDC. 
Seen. 13, supra. Moreover, any diminution in the value of 
the support payments for the child is mitigated by the extr_a 
his custodial parent and siblings to have no funds whatsoever. The overall 
practical effect of the AFDC program (even after the 1984 amendment), 
therefore, is to enhance the probability that a child whose custodial parent 
is receiving support payments in the child's behalf will obtain direct eco-
nomic benefit from those funds, in addition to the benefits that result from 
preserving the family unit. A reduction in that enhancement is no more a 
taking than any other reduction in a Social Security program. 
86-509 & 86-564-0PINION 
BOWEN v. GILLIARD 19 
$50 that the family r~ceives as a result of the assignment, by 
the extra AFDC benefits that are received by the inclusion of 
an additional family member in the unit, and by the fact that 
the State is using its own enforcement power to collect the 
support payments, and is bearing the risk of nonpayment in 
any given month. Whatever the diminution in value of the 
child's right to have support funds used for his or her "ex-
clusive" benefit may be, it is not so substantial as to con-
stitute a taking under our precedents. See Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S. --, --
(1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980); 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 
U. S~J , 131 (1978). 
Secon , the child receiving support payments holds no 
C.._rest protectable expectation that his or her parent will 
continue to receive identical support payments on the child's 
behalf, and that the child will enjoy the same rights with re-
spect to them. See Layton v. Layton, 263 N. C. 453, 456, 
139 S. E. 2d 732, 734 (1965) (support is "not a property right 
of the child"). The prospective right to support payments, 
and the child's expectations with respect to the use of such 
funds, are clearly subject to modification by law, be it 
through judicial decree, state legislation, or Congressional 
enactments. See N. C. G. S. § 50-13.7 (modification of 
order for child support). For example, one of the chief crite-
ria in assessing a child-support obligation is the noncustodial 
parent's ability to make payments, see Coggins v. Coggins, 
260 N. C. 765, 133 S. E. 2d 700 (1963); Douglas, Factors in 
Determining Child Support, 36 Juvenile and Family Court 
Journal27 (1985), and an adverse change in that parent's abil-
ity may, of course, require a modification of the decree. 2 J. 
Atkinson, Modern Child Custody Practice § 10.25, p. 527-528 
(1986) (discussing reductions in support). Any right to have 
the state force a noncustodial parent to make payments is, 
like so many other legal rights (including AFDC payments 
themselves), subject to modification by "the public acts of 
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government." Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U. S. 315, 319 
(1933); see generally Public Agencies Opposed to Social Secu-
rity Entrapment, supra, at--. As the District Court ex-
plained, Congress, and the States, through their implement-
ing statutes and regulations, have modified those rights 
through passage of (and the States' compliance with) the 
DEFRA amendments. See 633 F. Supp., at 1548-1551; 
Gorrie v. Bowen, 809 F. 2d 508, 521 (CAS 1987). This pro-
spective change in the child's expectations concerning future 
use of ~pport payments is far from anything we have ever 
deemed 4 taking. 
r . Finally i the character of the governmental action here mili-
\~.t~t~~ga:inst a finding that the States or Federal Govern-
ment unconstitutionally take property through the AFDC 
program. It is obviously necessary for the government to 
make hard choices and to balance various incentives in decid-
ing how to allocate benefits in this type of program. But a 
decision to include child support as part of the family income 
certainly does not implicate the type of concerns that the 
takings clause protects. This is by no means an enactment 
that forces "some people alone to bear burdens which, in all 
fairness, should be borne by the public as a whole." Arm-
strong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960). 
The law does not require any custodial parent to ap ly for 
AFDC benefits. ure y 1t 1 r asonable to presume that a 
parent who aoes make such an application does so because 
she or he is convinced that the family as a whole-as well as 
each child committed to her or his custody-will be better off 
with the benefits than without. In making such a decision, 
the parent is not taking a child's property without just com-
pensation; nor is the State doing so when it responds to that 
decision by supplementing the collections of support money 
with additional AFDC benefits. 
v 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Stewart described 
the courts' role in cases such as this: 
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"We do not decide today that the ... regulation is wise, 
that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic ob-
jectives that [Congress] might ideally espouse, or that a 
more humane system could not be devised. Conflicting 
claims of morality and intelligence are raised by oppo-
nents and proponents of almost every measure, certainly 
including the one before us. But the intractable eco-
nomic, social, and even philosophical problems presented 
by public welfare assistance programs are not the busi-
ness of the Court. The Constitution may impose certain 
procedural safeguards upon systems of welfare adminis-
tration, Goldberg v. Kelly, ante, p. 254. But the Con-
stitution does not empower this Court to second-guess 
. . . officials charged with the difficult responsibility of 
allocating limited public welfare funds among the myriad 
of potential recipients." Dandridge v. Williams, supra, 
at 487. 
The judgment of the District Court is 
Reversed. 
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I shall be circulating a dissent. 
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JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. 
Government in the modern age has assumed increasing re-
sponsibility for the welfare of its citizens. This expansion of 
responsibility has been accompanied by an increase in the 
scale and complexity of the activities that Government con-
ducts. Respect for the enormity of the administrative task 
that confronts the modern welfare state, as well as for the 
scarcity of Government resources, counsels that public offi-
cials must enjoy considerable discretion in determining the 
most effective means of fulfilling their responsibilities~ 1 
The very pervasiveness of modern Government, however, 
creates an unparalleled opportunity for intrusion on personal 
1 As we have said with respect to the Social Security program, for in-
stance, "[g]eneral rules are essential if a fund of this magnitude is to be 
administered with a modicum of efficiency, even though such rules inev-
itably produce seemingly arbitrary consequences in some individual cases." 
Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47, 53 (1977). 
J 
' . 
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life. In a society in which most persons receive some form of 
Government benefit, Government has considerable leverage 
in shaping individual behavior. In most cases, we acknowl-
edge that Government may wield its power even when its ac-
tions likely influence choices involving personal behavior. 
On rare occasions, however, Government intrusion into pri-
vate life is so direct and substantial that we must deem it in-
tolerable if we are to be true to our belief that there is a 
boundary between the public citizen and the private person. 
This is such a case. The Government has told a child who 
lives with a mother receiving public assistance that it cannot 
both live with its mother and be supported by its father. 
The child must either leave the care and custody of the 
mother, or forgo the support of the father and become a Gov-
ernment client. The child is put to this choice not because it 
seeks Government benefits for itself, but because of a fact 
over which it has no control: the need of other household 
members for public assistance. A child who lives with one 
parent has, under the best of circumstances, a diffic.ult time 
sustaining a relationship with both its parents. A crucial 
bond between a child and its parent outside the home, usually 
the father, is the father's commitment to care for the material 
needs of the child, and the expectation of the child that it may 
look to its father for such care. The Government has thus 
decreed that a condition of welfare eligibility for a mother 
is that her child surrender a vital connection with either the 
father or the mother. 
The Court holds that the Government need only show a ra-
tional basis for such action. This standard of review has reg-
ularly been used in evaluating the claims of applicants for 
Government benefits, since "a noncontractual claim to re-
ceive funds from the public treasury enjoys no constitution-
ally protected status." Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 
772 (1975). Plaintiff child support recipients in this case, 
however, are children who wish not to receive public assist-
ance, but to continue to be supported by their noncustodial 
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parent. Their claim is not that the Government has unfairly 
denied them benefits, but that it has intruded deeply into 
their relationship with their parents. More than a mere ra-
tional basis is required to withstand this challenge, and, as 
the following analysis shows, the Government can offer no 




The family is an institution "deeply rooted in this Nation's 
history and tradition." Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 
U. S. 494, 503 (1977). Our society's special solicitude for 
the family reflects awareness that "[i]t is through the family 
that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished 
values, moral and cultural." I d., at 503-504 (footnote omit-
ted). 2 As a result, we have long recognized that "freedom 
of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental 
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 753 (1982). See also 
Cleveland Board of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 639 
(1974). Therefore, "when the government intrudes on 
choices concerning family living arrangements, this Court 
must examine carefully the importance of governmental in-
terests advanced and the extent to which they are served by 
the challenged regulation." Moore, supra, at 499. 3 
A fundamental element of family life is the relationship 
between parent and child. As we said in Lehr v. Robertson, 
2 See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and 
Reform (OFFER), 431 U. S. 816, 844 (1977) (importance of the family 
"stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of 
daily association, and from the role it plays in 'promoting a way of life' 
through the instruction of children, as well as from the fact of blood rela-
tionship") (citation omitted). 
3 See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 503 (1965) ("there is a 
'realm of family life that the state cannot enter' without substantial justifi-
cation") (WHITE, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
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463 U. S. 248, 256 (1983), "[t]he intangible fibers that connect 
parent and child have infinite variety. They are woven 
throughout the fabric of our society, providing it with 
strength, beauty, and flexibility. It is self-evident that they 
are sufficiently vital to merit constitutional protection in ap-
propriate cases." We have thus been vigilant in ensuring 
that Government does not burden the ability of parent and 
child to sustain their vital connection. See, e. g., Santosky, 
supra, at 753; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972); Meyer 
v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923). 4 
"[T]he rights of the parents are a counterpart of the re-
sponsibilities they have assumed." Lehr, supra, at 257. 
When parents make a commitment to meet those responsibil-
ities, the child has a right to rely on the unique contribution 
of each parent to material and emotional support. The child 
therefore has a fundamental interest in the continuation of 
parental care and support, and a right to be free of govern-
mental action that would jeopardize it. As the next section 
discusses, a child in modern society faces perhaps more diffi-
culty than ever before in sustaining a relationship with both 
parents. 
B 
It is increasingly the case that a child in contemporary 
America lives in a household in which only one parent is 
present. The percentage of households headed by one par-
ent has doubled since 1970, from 13% to 26%. U. S. Dept. of 
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Re-
ports, Household and Family Characteristics: March 198~ 1 
'We have not hesitated to protect this relationship even when it has 
existed outside the traditional family arrangement. See, e. g., Caban v. 
Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380 (1979) (recognizing parental interest of unwed 
father who had participated in raising his children); Smith, supra, at 
846-847 (acknowledging fundamental liberty interest of parents whose 
child had been placed in temporary foster care). These cases reflect 
appreciation of the fact that the parent-child bond is a fundamental rela-
tionship that requires protection regardless, and perhaps especially be-
cause, of the misfortune and caprice that inevitably beset human affairs. 
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(1985) (Current Population Reports). 5 Researchers predict 
that "close to half of all children living in the United States 
today will reach age 18 without having lived continuously 
with both biological parents." Furstenberg, Nord, Peter-
son, & Zill, The Life Course of Children of Divorce: Marital 
Disruption and Parental Contact, 48 Am. Soc. Rev. 656 
(1983). 
Almost 90% of single-parent households are headed by 
women, 6 and a considerable percentage of them face great 
financial difficulty. One prominent reason is that divorce 
"produces a precipitous decline in women's household in-
comes." Weiss, The Impact of Marital Dissolution on In-
come and Consumption in Single-Parent Households, 46 J. 
Marriage & Fam. 115, 115 (1984). 7 In 1977, one-half of all 
related children under age 18 in female-headed households 
were below the poverty level. Espenshade, The Economic 
Consequences of Divorce, 41 J. Marriage & Fam. 615, 616 
(1979). Not surprisingly, many such households must rely 
on public assistance. 8 
5 Almost 60% of all black families with children are headed by one par-
ent, compared with only 36% in 1970. While only one in ten white families 
were headed by a single parent in 1970, the figure is now one in five. 
U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Re-
ports, Household and Family Characteristics: March 1984 5 (1985). 
6 Families headed by women accounted for 25% of the households added 
from 1980 to 1984, compared to 18% of the households added from 1970 to 
1980. Current Population Reports, at 2. See also H. Ross & I. Sawhill, 
Time of Transition: The Growth of Families Headed by Women (1975). -
7 One scholar has found that "when income is compared to needs, di-
vorced men experience an average 42 percent rise in their standard of liv-
ing in the first year after the divorce, while divorced women (and their 
children) experience a 73 percent decline." L. Weitzman, The Divorce 
Revolution 323 (1985). 
8 In May of 1982, of all AFDC families, only 9.4% had a father present in 
the home. U. S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Findings of the 
May 1981-May 1982 Aid to Families With Dependent Children Study 3 
(1985). 
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Increasing numbers of children in this country thus reside 
only with their mother, in a household whose financial condi-
tion is precarious. These children have a fundamental inter-
est in sustaining a relationship with their mother, since she is 
their primary source of daily emotional support. They also 
have a fundamental interest, of course, in sustaining a rela-
tionship with their father, whose absence from the household 
does not diminish the protection that must be afforded this 
parent-child relationship. The need for connection with the 
father is underscored by considerable scholarly research, 
which indicates that "[t]he optimal situation for the child is 
to have both an involved mother and an involved father." 
H. Biller, Paternal Deprivation 10 (1974). 9 Research indi-
cates that maintenance of a relationship with both parents is 
particularly important for children whose parents have di-
vorced: "By his or her presence or absence, the visiting par-
ent remains central to the psychic functioning of the chil-
dren." Wallerstein & Kelly, The Father-Child Relationship: 
Changes After Divorce, in The Father: Developmental and 
Clinical Perspectives 451, 454 (8. Cath, A. Gurwitt, and J. 
Ross, eds. 1982). 10 
In short, "training, nurture, and loving protection ... are 
at the heart of the parental relationship protected by the 
Constitution," Rivera v. Minnich, -- U. S. --, --
(1987), and a child's relationship with a father outside the 
home can be an important source of these benefits. 
9 "[P]aternal deprivation, including patterns of inadequate fathering as 
well as father absence, is a highly significant factor in the development-of 
serious psychological and social problems." I d., at 1. See also Hether-
ington & Deur, The Effects of Father Absence on Child Development, 26 
Young Children 233, 244 (1971) ("Father absence appears to be associated 
with a wide range of disruptions in social and cognitive development in 
children"). 
10 See also Hetherington, Divorce: A Child's Perspective, 34 American 
Psychologist 851, 856 (1979) ("Most children wish to maintain contact with 
the father, and in preschool children, mourning for the father and fantasies 
of reconciliation may continue for several years"). 
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The Government's insistence that a child living with an 
AFDC mother relinquish its child support deeply intrudes on 
the father-child relationship, for child support is a crucial 
means of sustaining the bond between a child and its father 
outside the home. A father's support represents a way in 
which the father can make an important contribution to rais-
ing the child, and the benefits to the child are both financial 
and emotional. 
Financially, child support makes available resources to 
help meet the child's daily material needs-resources espe-
cially important because of the financial difficulties that con-
front many households headed by women. Child support is 
also integrally related to the father's ongoing involvement in 
raising the child. The father is not there on a daily basis 
to wake the child in the morning, bring him or her to school, 
answer innumerable questions, offer guidance with personal 
problems, put the child to bed, and provide the countless 
doses of encouragement and consolation that daily life re-
quires. Nonetheless, by helping to meet the child's daily 
material needs, the father can let the child know that the 
father is committed to participating in the child's upbringing. 
Meals, clothes, toys, and other things made possible by this 
support represent this commitment even when the father 
cannot be there to affirm it himself. 11 
The provision of support by a father outside the home 
therefore constitutes a parent-child relationship founded 
upon the pledge of the father to provide support that is re-
sponsive to the particular needs of the unique child that is the 
"Studies of children of divorce, for instance, indicate that "children who 
were well-supported were significantly less likely to feel rejected by their 
father." Wallerstein & Huntington, Bread and Roses: Nonfinancial Issues 
Related to Fathers' Economic Support of Children Following Divorce, in 
The Parental Child-Support Obligation 135, 149 (J. Cassetty ed.) (1983). 
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father's own. 12 Braces, special shoes, lessons-a father may 
not be able to provide all these things for his child, but he is 
entitled to try. The father may not be the custodial parent, 
available on a daily basis. Nonetheless, he is the child's fa-
ther, and "[t]he significance of the biological relationship is 
that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other 
male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. 
If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of 
responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the bless-
ings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valu-
able contributions to the child's development." Lehr, supra, 
463 U. S., at 262. 
The role of child support in providing a "critical bond" be-
tween father and child, Brief for Juvenile and Family Court 
Judges as Amicus Curiae 23, is documented in studies on 
divorced families. "[C]hild support is unquestionably one 
of the major strands in the relationship between fathers and 
children in the years following divorce." Wallerstein & Hun-
tington, Bread and Roses: Nonfinancial Issues Related to Fa-
thers' Economic Support of Children Following Divorce, in 
The Parental Child-Support Obligation 135, 135 (J. Cassetty 
ed. 1983). As one national study concluded: 
"The performance of the parental role, especially for 
males, is linked to the ability to provide material support 
for the child following marital dissolution. It has been 
suggested that lower-status males withdraw from the 
paternal role when they cannot contribute materially to 
the welfare of the child. [This study provides] evidence 
12 Guidelines for those support obligations that are judicially-imposed, 
for instance, require consideration of the needs of the particular child in 
question. See, e. g., Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 9A U. L. A. 
§ 309 (1979 & 1987 Supp.) (court must consider, inter alia, "the physical 
and emotional condition of the child and his educational needs"). See also 
Douglas, Factors in Determining Child Support, 36 Juvenile & Fam. Court 
J. 27 (Fall 1985). 
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that fathers who pay some support are much more likely 
to see their children on a regular basis." Furstenberg, 
et al., supra, at 665. 13 
Thus, aside from its intrinsic importance, child support is a 
strand tightly interwoven with other forms of connection be-
tween father and child. Removal of this strand can unravel 
all the others. 
Through child support, then, children in the increasing 
number of one-parent families in this country have a means of 
sustaining a relationship with both parents. The bond with 
the custodial parent, usually the mother, is forged through 
daily contact and care. The bond with the parent outside the 
home, usually the father, is maintained to a significant de-
gree through provision for the child's material needs. In 
these ways, the family sustains the involvement of both par-
ents in the upbringing of the child as best as the fragmenta-
tion of their lives will permit. 
Such an arrangement is a hard-won accomplishment, for, 
sadly, the stresses of separation often result in the effective 
disintegration of the relationship of the child with the parent 
outside the home. 14 Many children report only infrequent 
visits from their fathers, and a large number do not receive 
'
3 If this is the case for the father-child relationship formed after divorce, 
it is even more true for those relationships out of wedlock. Father and 
child in those instances do not, as do families of divorce, have available a 
fund of prior daily association on which to draw in sustaining a parent-child 
bond. 
"For children of divorce, for instance, "[m]arital disruption effectively 
destroys the ongoing relationship between children and the biological par-
ent living outside the home in a majority of families." Furstenberg & 
Nord, Parenting Apart: Patterns ofChildrearing After Marital Disruption, 
47 J. Marriage & Fam. 893, 902 (1985). In one study, for instance, chil-
dren with a father outside the home were asked, "When you think about 
your family, who specifically do you include?" Virtually all children in-
cluded the biological parent with whom they were residing, and 72% men-
tioned their stepfather. Dishearteningly, however, only half the children 
included their biological father as a member of their family. /d., at 899. 
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the child support payments to which they are entitled. 15 The 
father outside the home and his child who sustain a relation-
ship therefore may claim a rare and fragile achievement, for 
"outside parents who are committed to maintaining a rela-
tionship are a special breed and their children recognize it." 
Furstenberg & Nord, supra, at 903. 
II 
The first part of this section describes the infringement on 
the parent-child relationship produced by the household filing 
requirement. The second part demonstrates that the claim 
presented in this case differs from the unsuccessful chal-
lenges to benefit programs that the Court relies upon to up-
hold the filing provision. 
A 
If a child is living with its mother and receiving support 
from its father, it is clear that the Government could not 
terminate either of these relationships without substantial 
justification. It could not remove the child from the custody 
of the mother without a compelling reason, and would have to 
prove its case by clear and convincing evidence to do so. 
Santosky v. Kramer, supra. The argument that other con-
nections might remain would be unavailing, for the custodial 
relationship is a vital bond between mother and child. 
Nor could the Government forbid the father from support-
ing his child without some powerful justification. A father is 
entitled to support his child, and the child is entitled to look 
to the father for this support. To prohibit paternal support 
would deny the father a crucial means of participating in the 
upbringing of the child, and deny the child its entitlement to 
15 "Despite court orders, noncustodial fathers fail to pay $4 billion in child 
support each year. More than half (53%) of the millions of women who are 
due child support do not receive the court-ordered support." L. Weitz-
man, supra, at 262 (footnote omitted). See also D. Chambers, Making 
Fathers Pay (1979); Hetherington, Cox, & Cox, The Aftermath of Divorce, 
in Mother/Child Father/Child Relationships 149, 163 (J. Stevens & M. 
Mathews, eds.) (1978). 
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receive support from a biological parent who has a deep-
rooted interest in seeing that the particular needs of that 
child are met. The argument that other forms of connection 
might remain likewise would be unavailing, for a father's sup-
port of his own child is integral to sustaining the parent-child 
relationship. 
The intrusion on the fundamental interest in family life in 
each of these scenarios should be apparent to us all. Yet the 
Government in this case has used its economic leverage to 
achieve exactly the same result. It has told children who 
live with mothers who need AFDC that they cannot both live 
with their mothers and receive child support from their fa-
thers. Rather than terminate either relationship itself, the 
Government requires the child to choose between them. It 
has declared that, for an indigent mother with a child receiv-
ing child support, a condition of her AFDC eligibility is that 
her child relinquish its fundamental constitutional interest in 
maintaining a vital bond with either her or the child's father. 
On the one hand, if the child stays with its mother, the fa-
ther is told that henceforth the Government, not he, will sup-
port the child. Unless he is wealthy enough to support the 
entire household, all but $50 of any support payment that the 
father makes will be used to reimburse the Government for 
making a welfare payment for use by the whole family. This 
conversion of the father's support payment into Government 
reimbursement means that the father is rendered powerless 
in most cases to respond to the special financial needs of his 
child. 
It is important to illustrate why this is the case. Let us 
suppose that a couple with one child obtains a divorce, that 
the mother has a child by a previous marriage, and that the 
mother has custody of the two children. The mother has no 
source of income, but the father from whom she obtained her 
recent divorce provides $150 a month to support his child. If 
the mother desires to keep both her children, the $150 in · 
child support must be assigned to the State. In return, the 
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three-person household receives, let us say, $400 a month in 
AFDC. Of the $150 in child support assigned to the State, 
$50 is returned for use of the child for whom it was paid, and 
$100 is kept by the State as reimbursement for its welfare 
payment. 
If the father wanted to increase the amount of child sup-
port, say to $200, because of the child's special needs, none of 
the extra money would go to the child. The family would still 
receive $400 in AFDC, and the child would still receive $50 of 
the support payment. The only difference would be that the 
State would now get to keep $150 as reimbursement for the 
welfare payment. By continuing to live with the mother, 
the child has lost not only the financial benefit of the father's 
support, but a father-child relationship founded on the fa-
ther's commitment to care for the material needs of his child. 
If the child has a conscientious father who has shouldered his 
paternal duty, that father will be enlisted to help defray the 
cost of providing for other children whose fathers are not so 
responsible. A child thus must pay a high price for continu-
ing to live with its mother. 
This price is not merely speculative. The affidavits in this 
case establish it. Diane Thomas, for instance, has two chil-
dren, Crystal, age 9, and Sherrod, age 7. Appendix to Juris-
dictional Statement (App.) 22a. Although she has sought 
gainful employment, she has been unable to find work. 
Crystal's father has almost never complied with a court order 
requiring him to contribute to Crystal's support. Sherrod's 
father, however, has voluntarily paid $200 a month on a regu-
lar basis toward Sherrod's support. Prior to October 1984, 
Ms. Thomas received $194 a month in AFDC for the support 
of herself and Crystal. In October, she received a notice 
that if she did not file an AFDC application for Sherrod and 
assign his child support to the State her assistance would be 
terminated. She then applied for benefits for herself and 
both her children, assigning Sherrod's child support rights to 
the State. Because the child support is now regarded as the 
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income of the whole household, the AFDC grant has been re-
duced to $73 a month. Whereas Sherrod formerly had been 
entitled to $200 a month in support, he is now entitled to one-
third of the $273 total income attributed to the household, or 
$91, and to $50 of his father's monthly support check assigned 
to the State, for a total of $141. The financial cost to 
Sherrod of staying with his mother is thus $59 a month. 
Sherrod has paid an emotional price for continuing to live 
with his mother as well. Two months after the household 
began receiving welfare, Sherrod's father began to withhold 
support payments. Ms. Thomas stated, "He informed me 
that as long as I was going to use Sherrod's support money to 
support Crystal, he would continue to withhold the support." 
I d., at 25a. Furthermore, he has not visited Sherrod since 
beginning to withhold support payments. As Ms. Thomas 
stated, "[Sherrod's father] is extremely opposed to his son 
being on welfare benefits, and has told me that he stopped 
seeing his son because I now receive AFDC for Sherrod." 
ld., at 26a. Sherrod, of course, has no control over any of 
this, but nonetheless must suffer the loss of his father's care: 
"Sherrod is very upset that his father no longer visits 
him. He frequently asks me why his daddy does not 
come to see him anymore. Since the time his father has 
stopped visitation, Sherrod has begun to wet his bed on 
a frequent basis. Also since the visitation stopped, 
Sherrod has become much more disruptive, especially in 
school. Furthermore, his performance in school seems 
to have declined." ld., at 26a-27a. 16 
The testimony at trial in this case sheds some light on the 
reactions of fathers such as Sherrod's. Professor Stack of 
Duke University testified: 
16 While Sherrod's father may be criticized, he is under no judicially-
imposed obligation to pay support. The record thus contains more than 
mere "evidence that a few noncustodial parents were willing to violate the 
law by not making court-ordered support payments." Ante, at-. 
14 
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"A law that tells fathers that their efforts cannot keep 
their children off the welfare rolls, or that what they 
can provide is not good enough, challenges the efforts 
and integrity of good men and fathers. Feelings of an-
ger, frustration, and shame are not inappropriate or 
unexpected. The anger is sometimes vented at chil-
dren, sometimes at mothers, more often both." I d., at 
82a-83a. 
North Carolina District Judge Hunt also testified about her 
experience in dealing with fathers who have an obligation to 
provide child support: 
"Many of these fathers grew up on welfare and they are 
very sensitive to ... the lack of a father involved in their 
lives. They know and understand the pride the child 
feels when he or she can say 'my daddy supports me.' 
These fathers know firsthand that the children will grow 
up knowing that they are on welfare and that their moth-
ers depend for support on a check each month from the 
Department of Human Resources and that food stamps 
buy the groceries. It isn't the same as financial and 
emotional support from your own father." Id., at 84a. 
The reaction of Sherrod's father may be misguided. It 
may be that he should overcome the obstacles the Govern-
ment has placed in his way, and still maintain some form of 
involvement in Sherrod's life. The point, however, is that 
he should not have to try. 
The financial and emotional cost of losing this connection 
with the father may be too much for the child to bear. If so, 
the only way to avoid it is for the child to leave the custody 
of the mother. This price for continuing to receive support 
from the father also is not speculative. At least one of the 
families in this case has chosen this course. Mary Medlin has 
four children, one of whom, Karen, receives $200 in child sup-
port from her father, and another of whom, Jermaine, re-
ceives $50 in support. I d., at 27a-28a. Ms. Medlin origi-
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nally received $223 in AFDC for herself and her two other 
children. When, as required, she added Karen and J ermaine 
to the welfare rolls, her entire family became ineligible 
for AFDC. In order to obtain assistance for her family, she 
agreed to relinquish custody of Karen to her father. I d. , 
at 29a. 
Karen may now keep her $200 in child support, and her 
mother may now obtain AFDC for herself and her other chil-
dren. They may no longer, however, live in the same house-
hold. The burden of their choice hardly requires elabora-
tion. "Continuity of relationships, surroundings, and 
environmental influence are essential for a child's normal 
development." J. Goldstein, A. Freud, & A. Solnit, Beyond 
the Best Interests of the Child 31-32 (2d ed. 1979). 17 The 
relationship between the child and the custodial parent is a 
bond forged by intimate daily association, and severing it un-
alterably transforms the parent-child relationship. It may 
be that parent and child will be able to fashion some type of 
new relationship; even if they do, however, each has lost 
something of incalculable value. 
It is thus clear that in this case the Government "'directly 
and substantially' interfere[s] with family living arrange-
ments and thereby burden[s] a fundamental right." Lyng, 
-- U. S., at --, quoting Zablocki, 434 U. S., at 387. 
The infringement is direct, because a child whose mother 
needs AFDC cannot escape being required to choose between 
living with the mother and being supported by the father. It 
is substantial because the consequence of that choice is dam-
age to a relationship between parent and child. Further-
more, the Government has created an inherent conflict be-
tween the interests of the father and the mother. As the 
record in this case testifies, a typical father will feel strongly 
that his son should be supported by him and not by public as-
sistance. The typical mother will feel that loss of the fa-
17 See also Bowlby, Attachment and Loss: Retrospect and Prospect, 52 
Amer. J . Orthopsychiatry 666 (1982). 
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ther's support is a price worth paying to keep the child with 
her. The child may well be swept up in a custody dispute over 
which living arrangement is in its best interest, especially 
given the recent trend toward easier modification of custody 
arrangements. See Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of 
Child Custody Decreees, 94 Yale L. J. 757, 760-782 (1985). 
In short, the Government has sliced deeply into family life, 
pitting father against mother, with the child in the middle. 
B 
The nature of the interest asserted in this case, as well as 
the direct disruption produced by the Government, distin-
. guishes this case from typical challenges to the operation of 
Government benefit programs. 
First, unlike those cases on which the Court relies, plaintiff 
children receiving child support do not assert that they have 
been unfairly denied a Government benefit. Rather, they 
claim that the Government has deeply intruded on their rela-
tionships with their parents. 18 In Weinberger, supra, we di-
rectly acknowledged the difference between these two types 
of claims: "Unlike the claims involved in Stanley and 
LaFleur, a noncontractual claim to receive funds from the 
public treasury enjoys no constitutionally protected status." 
422 U. S., at 772 (emphasis added). The children in this case 
obviously present claims based on the constitutionally pro-
tected interest in family life involved in Stanley and LaFleur. 
Their claims thus must be met by more than a mere dem-
onstration that there is some plausible basis for the Govern-
ment's action. 
This leads to a second point. We are willing to accept the 
validity of many conditions on participation in Government 
programs because this Court has never held that anyone has 
18 Members of the plaintiff class also include fathers whose interest in 
the parent-child relationship is to be able to support their children. Com-
plaint 4. Obviously, these plaintiffs also are not applicants for Govern-
ment benefits. 
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an absolute right to receive public assistance. The Court 
has thus assumed that participation in a benefit program 
reflects a decision by a recipient that he or she is better off 
by meeting whatever conditions are attached to participation 
than not receiving benefits. In assessing the burdens im-
posed by a program, then, the theory is that whatever rea-
sonable burdens are borne by the recipient are willingly as-
sumed. Thus, for instance, if a child, through its mother, 
voluntarily wishes to participate in the AFDC program, the 
requirement that child support be assigned to the State is one 
of the conditions to which a recipient is deemed to have freely 
consented. See 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(26) (Supp. III 1985). 
In this case, however, the burden placed on the child is not 
the result of his or her voluntary application for AFDC bene-
fits. Indeed, participants in this lawsuit are children who do 
not wish to receive AFDC. Rather, the child must choose 
between the father and mother solely because other house-
hold members are indigent and desire public assistance. It 
is the presence of these persons in the household, not the 
child's voluntary application for public assistance, that trig-
gers the requirement that it choose which parental relation-
ship to maintain. 
The Government has thus placed a burden on the child's 
fundamental interest in a relationship with both parents on 
the basis of a factor over which the child has no control. 
What we said with respect to illegitimacy in Weber v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 175 (1972), is equally 
applicable here: imposing such a burden "is contrary to the 
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear 
some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. 
Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing 
the illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as unjust-
way of deterring the parent." See also Trimble v. Gordon, 
430 U. S. 762, 770 (1977) (children "can affect neither their 
parents' conduct nor their own status"). The paradigm of 
the willing AFDC participant is inapplicable in this case, for 
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the child's fundamental rights are infringed so that other 
members of the household can receive the assistance that 
they desire. In insisting that the mother use one child's sup-
port to purchase AFDC for other household members, the 
Government ignores our pronouncement in Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 170 (1944): "Parents may be free 
to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow that 
they are free . . . to make marytrs of their children before 
they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when 
they can make that choice for themselves." 
Finally, the disruption directly produced by the household 
filing requirement distinguishes this case from cases in which 
we have upheld Government benefit provisions from a chal-
lenge that they interfered with family life. In Lyng, supra, 
for instance, we upheld the Food Stamp program's presump-
tion that parents, children, and siblings who live together 
constitute a single "household," so that such persons could 
not individually apply for benefits as separate households. 
We noted that the definition "does not order or prevent any 
group of persons from dining together. Indeed, in the over-
whelming majority of cases it probably has no effect at all." 
ld., at--. In Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47 (1977), we 
upheld a provision whereby a recipient of dependent Social 
Security benefits lost those benefits upon marriage to anyone 
other than another beneficiary, even though we acknowl-
edged that the provision "may have an impact on a secondary 
beneficiary's desire to marry, and may make some suitors 
less welcome than others." I d., at 58. These cases reflect 
recognition that the extensive activities of Government 1n 
modern society inevitably have the potential for creating in-
centives and disincentives for certain behavior. Certainly, 
one could plausibly contend that much of what Government 
does, from tax policy to regulatory initiatives, might in some 
way have some influence on decisions relating to family life. 
Yet such plausible speculation cannot provide the basis for a 
constitutional challenge. 
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In this case, however, the impact of Government action is 
not speculative, but direct and substantial. If a child-sup-
port recipient lives with a mother who needs public assist-
ance, AFDC will be provided only if the child either leaves 
the household or gives up its right to support from its father. 
Determining whether other eligibility requirements for Gov-
ernment assistance will influence family choices may call for 
subtle inquiry into the nuances of human motivation. Here, 
however, the burden on family life is inescapable, because it 
is directly required by the Government as a condition of ob-
taining benefits. "'Governmental imposition of such a choice 
puts the same kind of burden upon [the child's rights] as 
would a fine imposed against'" the child for living with 
its mother or being supported by its father. Hobbie v. Un-
employment Appeals Comm'n, -- U. S. --, -- (1987) 
(citation omitted). 
The contention in this case is therefore that the Govern-
ment has burdened the fundamental interest of a child in 
maintaining a custodial relationship with its mother and a 
support relationship with its father. Such a burden must be 
justified by more than a mere assertion that the provision is 
rational. 
III 
Turning first to the Government's purpose in enacting the 
provision at issue in this case, the Government urges that the 
change in the household filing requirement was meant to be a 
"rational means of carrying out Congress' conclusion that 
families whose members have access to additional sources _of 
income have less need for government assistance than fam-
ilies without access to such income." Brief for United States 
41. 
This concern for program efficiency is certainly a valid 
objective, and serves to justify Governmental action in most 
cases. It cannot in itself, however, provide a purpose suffi-
ciently important to justify an infringement on fundamental 
constitutional rights. If it could, its reach would be limit-
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less, for it is probably more efficient in most cases for Gov-
ernment to operate without regard to the obstacles of the 
Constitution than to attend to them. Nonetheless, "the Con-
stitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency." 
Stanley, supra, at 656. It is true that Congress could, if it 
chose, completely eliminate the AFDC program in order to 
save money, for this Court has held that no one may claim a 
constitutional right to public assistance. Having chosen to 
operate such a program, however, it may not invoke the effi-
ciency of that program as a basis for infringing the constitu-
tional rights of recipients. See, e. g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U. S. 618, 633 (1969) (in equal protection context, "[t]he 
saving of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious 
classification"). Surely no one could contend, for instance 
that a concern for limiting welfare outlays could justify man-
datory sterilization of AFDC beneficiaries, or the forfeiture 
of all personal possessions. "Indeed," as we have said: 
"one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and 
the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were de-
signed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citi-
zenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and ef-
ficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government 
officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones." 
Stanley, supra, at 656. 
Thus, the Government's desire to target AFDC payments 
more efficiently cannot in itself serve to justify infringement 
of the child's fundamental interest in living with its mother 
and being supported by its father. Even if a concern for p:r:_o-
gram efficiency could serve as a sufficiently important objec-
tive in this context, however, the Government need not in-
fringe upon family life in order to accomplish it. 
It may well be unrealistic to assume that no child support 
is available as a common household resource, given the fact 
that a child enjoys such common benefits as shelter, utilities, 
and food. It is thus reasonable to account for the reality 
of household living by assuming that a portion of the child-
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support payment is used to meet the child's share of these 
common expenses. Thus, the Government could regard as 
household income that portion of the support payment that 
represents the child's pro rata share of common expenses. 
This calculation could be done easily for each household size, 
and would require no case-by-case determinations. Such at-
tribution of income would require no preemption of state 
child-support law, since the use of support payments to meet 
the child's share of such common expenses is consistent with 
state law requirements that child support be used solely for 
the benefit of the child. 19 
At the same time, such a provision leaves intact the father-
child-support bond. In making a commitment to meet the 
particular needs of his child, the father surely realizes that 
some of those needs are common needs for which it is only 
fair to seek a contribution from the child. This is far differ-
ent, however, from assuming that the entire child-support 
payment is available for the whole household. The father's 
unique relationship is with his child, not with other members 
of the household, and the father and child, not the Govern-
ment, should be the ones to decide if it should continue. 
If the Government is concerned that some mothers may be 
violating their fiduciary duty to their child by using the sup-
port payment for all household members, it could easily re-
quire as a condition of AFDC participation that the mother 
account for the use of child-support money. If the money is 
in fact being used for everyone, the father is not simply sup-
porting his child, but everyone, so that the child has no spe-
19 See, e. g., N. C. G. S. § 50-13.4(d) (child support payments for minor 
child must be paid to custodian "for the benefit of such child"). See also 
Goodyear v. Goodyear, 257 N. C. 374, 379 (1962) (parent is trustee for chil-
dren who receive support, and may use payments only "for the benefit of 
[these] children"). It is true that benefits to other household members 
may redound to the benefit of the child. There must be some limit to such 
attribution of benefits, however, if we are to adhere to our tradition that 
the welfare of the individual is not completely reducible to the welfare of 
the group. 
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cial parental support relationship different from any other 
child in the household. In that case, it is fair to require the 
assignment of child support to the Government, since this re-
quirement does not represent the child's relinquishment of a 
distinctive father-child bond. The assignment provision in 
such an instance does no more than reflect the family mem-
bers' own decision about how the child support should be 
used. It may be that the accounting will inform the father 
that the money is being used against his wishes, so that he 
will demand that it be used for his child. Families may re-
solve this disagreement in various ways, but the resolution 
will reflect the decision of the parents, not the Government, 
as to the best way to meet the needs of the child. 
If an accounting revealed that some, but not all, of the sup-
port were used for the needs of other household members, 
the Government would be free to attribute this amount as 
household income, and to require the assignment of some 
representative portion of the support payment. That por-
tion used or saved for the child's special needs, however, 
could not go the Government, for it represents the father's 
commitment to meeting the particular needs of his child. 
These funds may be used to permit the child to pursue a par-
ticular interest, to help defray the cost of special training 
necessary because of a learning diability, or to save for the 
child's education. Whatever the use to which the money is 
put, the child knows that it may look to its father for it. The 
allocation of the support payment between the needs of the 
child and other household members represents the decision of 
family members, not the Government, as to how best to raise 
the child. 
Finally, to the extent that Congress sought recognition to 
the fact that individuals living together enjoy some econo-
mies of scale, ante, at--, this could be addressed far less 
disruptively. The Government need only require that the 
child support recipient be included in the calculation of house-
hold size. Since per capita AFDC payments are lower the 
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larger the household, this measure would accomplish the 
Government's end while not intruding on the parent-child 
relationship. 
The Government's justification for its direct and substan-
tial infringement on parent-child relationships thus falls 
short. As salutary as a desire for cost-effective program 
management may be, alone it is not a purpose of adequate 
magnitude to warrant such infringement. Even if it were, 
the Government need not abandon its desire to target AFDC 
more efficiently in order to avoid direct intrusion into the in-
timate domain of family life. Measures are available that 
would achieve a more realistic consideration of household in-
come while still permitting a child to sustain vital bonds with 
both its father and mother. As a result, the household filing 
requirement cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. This 
conclusion does not represent an effort to second-guess Con-
gress as to the most effective use of its funds, nor does it rep-
resent a threat to the discretion that program officials must 
inevitably exercise. Rather, it reflects adherence to the 
principle that on those rare occasions that the Government 
deeply and directly intrudes on basic family relationships, 
there must be a powerful justification for doing so. 
IV 
In The Republic and in The Laws, Plato offered a vision of 
a unified society, where the needs of children are met not by 
parents but by the Government, and where no intermediate 
forms of association stand between the individual and the 
State. Plato, The Republic, in The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 
II 163 (B. Jowett transl. 1953); The Laws, id., Vol. IV, at 
189. The vision is a brilliant one, but it is not our own: 
"Although such measures have been deliberately ap-
proved by men of great genius, their ideas touching the 
relation between individual and State were wholly differ-
ent from those upon our institutions rest; and it hardly 
will be affirmed that any legislature could impose such 
24 
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restrictions upon the people of a State without doing 
violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution." 
Meyer, supra, 262 U. S., at 402. 
If we are far removed from the Platonic republic, it is be-
cause our commitment to diversity and decentralized human 
relationships has made us attentive to the danger of Govern-
ment intrusion on private life. Those who are affected by 
the Government in this case are fathers and children who 
have sustained a relationship whereby the child is supported 
by the father, not dependent on the State. The State has 
told the child that if it is to live with a mother not so fortu-
nate, it too must become a dependent of the State. If it does 
so, the child's material needs will no longer met by a father's 
attention to his particular child. Rather, the child will be 
one of many who are supported by the Government, and the 
father, powerless to direct assistance to his child, can only 
reimburse the Government for supporting the entire house-
hold. Such an arrangement calls to mind Aristotle's criti-
cism of the family in Plato's republic: "[E]ach citizen will have 
a thousand sons: they will not be the sons of each citizen indi-
vidually: any and every son will be equally the son of any and 
every father; and the result will be that every son will be 
equally neglected by every father." Aristotle, Politics 44 
(E . Barker trans. 1958). Regardless of the benevolence with 
which it is issued, a Government check is no substitute for 
the personal support of a loving father. 
"Happy families," wrote Tolstoy, "are all alike; every un-
happy family is unhappy in its own way." L. Tolstoy, An!la 
Karenina 1 (C. Garnet transl. 1978). Contemporary life of-
fers countless ways in which family life can be fractured and 
families made unhappy. The children who increasingly live 
in these families are entitled to the chance to sustain a special 
relationship with both their fathers and their mothers, re-
gardless of how difficult that may be. Parents are entitled 
to provide both daily emotional solace and to meet their 
child's material needs; the fact that in some families a differ-
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ent parent may take on each role does not diminish the child's 
right to the care of both parents. The Government could not 
prohibit parents from performing these duties, and what it 
cannot do by direct fiat it should not be able to do by eco-
nomic force. The Government has decreed that the only 
way a child can live with its mother and be supported by its 
father is if the mother is wealthy enough not to require public 
assistance. A child cannot be held responsible for the indi-
gency of its mother, and should not be forced to choose be-
tween parents because of something so clearly out of its con-
trol. No society can assure its children that there will be no 
unhappy families. It can tell them, however, that their Gov-
ernment will not be allowed to contribute to the pain. 
I dissent. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 86-509 AND 86-564 
OTIS R. BOWEN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVICES, PETITIONER 
86-509 v. 
BEATY MAE GILLIARD ET AL. 
DAVID T. FLAHERTY, SECRETARY, NORTH 
CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
RESOURCES, ET AL., APPELLANTS 
86-564 v. 
BEATY MAE GILLIARD ET AL. 
ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STAT DISTRICT CO RT FOR 
THE WESTERN DISTRICT 0 ORTH CAROLIN 
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opm10n of the Court. 
As part of its major effort to reduce the federal deficit 
through the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 494, Con-
gress amended the statute authorizing Federal Aid to Fam-
ilies with Dependent Children (AFDC) 1 to require that a 
family's eligibility for benefits must take into account, with 
certain specified exceptions, the income of all parents, broth-
'"'The AFDC program is based on a scheme of cooperative federalism.' 
King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 316 (1968). Established by Title IV of the 
Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 627, 'to provide financial assistance to 
needy dependent children and the parents or relatives who live with and 
care for them,' Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U. S. 251, 253 (1974), the federal 
program reimburses each State which chooses to participate with a per-
centage of the funds it expends. § 403, 42 U. S. C. § 603. In return, the 
State must administer its assistance program pursuant to a state plan that 
conforms to applicable federal statutes and regulations. § 402, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 602.'' Heckler v. Turner, 470 U. S. 184, 189 (1985). 
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ers and sisters living in the same home. 2 The principal 
question presented in this appeal is whether that require-
ment violates the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution when it is applied to require a family wishing to 
receive AFDC benefits to include within its unit a child for 
whom child support payments are being made by a noncus-
todial parent. 
2 The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 494, which fills over 700 
pages of the statutes at large, includes two major divisions, the Tax Re-
form Act of 1984 and the Spending Reduction Act of 1984. The amend-
ment at issue in this case is found in the latter division, 98 Stat. 1145. As 
a result of that amendment, § 402(a)(38) of the Social Security Act, 42 
U. S. C. 602(a)(38) (1982 ed., Supp. Ill) now provides, in pertinent part: 
"A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must-
"(38) provide that in making the determination undet: paragraph (7) with 
respect to a dependent child and applying paragraph (8), the State agency 
shall (except as otherwise provided in this part) include-
"(A) any parent of such child, and 
"(B) any brother or sister of such child, if such brother or sister meets 
the conditions described in clauses (1) and (2) of section 606(a) of this title, 
if such parent, brother, or sister is living in the same home as the de-
pendent child, and any income of or available for such parent, brother, 
or sister shall be included in making such determination and applying 
such paragraph with respect to the family (notwithstanding section 405(j) 
of this title, in the case of benefits provided under subchapter II of this 
chapter) .... " 
Section 406(a), in turn, provides: 
"The term 'dependent child' means a needy child (1) who has been de-
prived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued ab-
sence from the home . . . or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and 
who is living with his father , mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, 
sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first 
cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place of residence maintained by one or more 
of such relatives as his or their own home, and (2) who is (A) under the age 
of eighteen, or (B) at the option of the State, under the age of nineteen and 
a full-time student in a secondary school (or in the equivalent level of voca-
tional or technical training), if before he attains age nineteen, he may rea-
sonably be expected to complete the program of such secondary school (or 
such training)." 42 U. S. C. § 606(a). 
·. 
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I 
This litigation began in 1970. At that time the federal 
statute did not require that all parents and siblings be in-
cluded in an AFDC filing unit. Thus, for example, if a teen-
age child had significant income of her own, perhaps from 
wages or perhaps in support payments from an absent par-
ent, the other members of her family could exclude her from 
the filing unit in order to avoid disqualifying the entire family 
from benefits or reducing its level of benefits. 
Beaty Mae Gilliard, one of the named class members in the 
1970 suit, 3 began receiving public assistance from North Car-
olina under AFDC in 1962. In February 1970, after her sev-
enth child was born, the State automatically included him in 
the filing unit, thereby increasing the family's monthly allot-
ment from $217 to $227 to reflect the difference between the 
benefit for a family of seven and the benefit for a family of 
eight. Gilliard was, however, also receiving $43.33 each 
month in child support from the baby's father. When a for-
mal parental support order was entered in April 1970, the 
State credited the support payments against her account and 
reduced her monthly benefit to $184. Gilliard sued, contend-
ing that she had a statutory right to exclude her seventh child 
from the unit and thus to continue to receive the $217 benefit 
for a family of seven and also to retain the $43.33 paid by her 
youngest child's father. A three-judge District Court 
agreed with her reading of the statute and entered an order 
requiring the State to reinstate her benefits at the $217 level 
and to reimburse her for the improper credits of $43 per 
month. Gilliard v. Craig, 331 F. Supp. 587 (WDNC 1971). 
The District Court also granted class-wide relief. We af-
3 The class was comprised of "persons who have been or may be subject 
to reduction of AFDC . . . benefits based upon unconstitutional or illegal 
claim of credit by administering agencies for outside income and other re-
sources available to some but not all of a family group." Gilliard v. Craig, 
331 F. Supp. 587, 588 (WDNC 1971). 
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firmed that judgment. 409 U. S. 807 (1972). No constitu-
tional question was decided at that time. 
Congress amended the AFDC program in 1975 to require, 
as a condition of eligibility, that applicants for assistance 
must assign to the State any right to receive child support 
payments for any member of the family included in the filing 
unit. 4 In response, North Carolina amended its laws to pro-
vide that the acceptance of public assistance on behalf of a de-
pendent child would constitute an assignment of any right to 
support for that child. See N. C. Gen. Stat. § 110-137 
(Supp. 1985). These amendments, however, did not harm 
recipients like Gilliard because they did not affect the right to 
define the family unit covered by an application and thereby 
to exclude children with independent income, such as a child 
for whom support payments were being made. 
In 1983, the Secretary of Health and Human Services pro-
posed certain amendments to the Social Security Act to "as-
sure that limited Federal and State resources are spent as 
· effectively as possible." Letter of 25 May 1983, to the Hon-
orable George Bush, President of the Senate, App. 168-169 
(hereinafter Heckler Letter). One of the Secretary's pro-
posals was "to establish uniform rules on the family members 
' Section 402(a)(26)(A) provides: 
"[A]s a condition of eligibility for aid, each applicant or recipient will be 
required-
"(A) to assign to the State any rights to support from any other person 
such applicant may have (i) in his own behalf or in behalf of any other fam-
ily member for whom the applicant is applying for or receiving aid, and (ii) 
which have accrued at the time such assignment is executed .... " 42 
U. S. C. § 602(a)(26)(A) (1982 ed., Supp. Ill). 
The 197.5 amendment also amended § 402 to .require recipients to: 
"cooperate with the State (i) in establishing the paternity of a child born 
out of wedlock with respect to whom aid is claimed, and (ii) in obtaining 
support payments for such applicant and for a child with respect to whom 
such aid is claimed, or in obtaining any other other payments or property 
due such applicant or such child .... " 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a)(26)(B) (1982 
ed., Supp. Ill). 
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who must file together for AFDC, and the situations in which 
income must be counted. In general, the parents, sisters, 
and brothers living together with a dependent child must all 
be included; the option of excluding a sibling with income, 
for example, would no longer be available." Ibid. The Sec-
retary stressed that the improvements would result in an 
AFDC allocation program that "much more realistically re-
flects the actual home situation." Id., at 169. 
The Secretary's proposal was not enacted in 1983, but one 
of the provisions in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 
(DEFRA) established a standard filing unit for the AFDC 
program. The Senate Finance Committee estimated that 
the change would save $455,000,000 during the next three fis- · 
cal years. S. Rep. No. 98-169, p. 980 (1984) (hereinafter 
Senate Report). It explained the purpose of the amendment 
in language that removes any possible ambiguity in the rele-
vant text of the statute: 5 
"Present Law 
"There is no requirement in present law that parents 
and all siblings be included in the AFDC filing unit. 
Families applying for assistance may exclude from the 
filing unit certain family members who have income 
which might reduce the family benefit. For example, a 
family might choose to exclude a child who is receiving 
social security or child support payments, if the pay-
5 In support of the District Court's judgment, appellees have asked us 
to adopt a construction of the statute that is completely inconsistent with 
the intent of Congress as explained in the Secretary's request for the 
legislation, in the Senate Report, and in the Conference Report as well. 
Moreover, the arguments are inconsistent with the unambiguous regula-
tions the Secretary has adopted to implement the statute. See 45 CFR 
§ 206.10(a)(1)(vii) (1986). The District Court carefully considered these 
statutory arguments and rejected them. Gilliard v. Kirk, 633 }". Supp. 
1529, 1548 (WDNC 1986). : We agree with that court's analysis of the 
meaning of the statute and find no merit in appellees' statutory arguments 
advanced in this Court. See also Gorrie v. Bowen, 809 F . 2d 508, 513-516 
(CA8 1987). 
6 
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ments would reduce the family's benefits by an amount 
greater than the amount payable on behalf of the 
child .... 
"Explanation of Provision 
"The provision approved by the Committee would re-
quire States to include in the filing unit the parents and 
all dependent minor siblings (except SSI recipients and 
any stepbrothers and stepsisters) living with a child who 
applies for or receives AFDC .... 
"This change will end the present practice whereby 
families exclude members with income in order to maxi-
mize family benefits, and will ensure that the income of 
family members who live together and share expenses is 
recognized and counted as available to the family as a 
whole." I d., at 980. 
See also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 98-861, p. 1407 (1984). 
Because the 1984 amendment forced families to include in 
the filing unit children for whom support payments were 
being received, the practical effect was that many families' 
total income was reduced. 6 The burden of the change was 
mitigated somewhat by a separate amendment providing that 
the first $50 of child support collected by the State must be 
remitted to the family and not counted as income for the pur-
pose of determining its benefit level. 7 See 42 U. S. C. 
§602(a)(8)(A)(vi) (1982 ed., Supp. III); 42 U. s·. C. §657(b)(1) 
(1982 ed., Supp. Ill). Thus, the net effect of the 1984 
• For example, under the July 1985levels of payment in North Carolina, 
a family of four with no other income would have received $269. A child's 
support income of $100 would therefore reduce the family's AFDC pay-
ment to $169 if that child was included in the filing unit. The family would 
have a net income of $269. But if the family were permitted to exclude the 
child from the unit and only claim the somewhat smaller benefit of $246 for 
a family of three, it could have collected that amount plus the excepted 
child's $100 and have a net income of $346. See App. 85. 
7 Therefore, under our example, n. 6, supra, the net income with the 
child included in the unit would have been $319. 
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Amendments for a family comparable to Gilliard's would in-
clude three changes: (1) the addition of the child receiving 
support would enlarge the filing unit and entitle the family to 
a somewhat larger benefit; (2) child support would be treated 
as family income and would be assigned to the State, thereby 
reducing the AFDC benefits by that amount; and (3) the re-
duction would be offset by $50 if that amount was collected 
from an absent parent. In sum, if the assigned support ex-
ceeded $50 plus the difference in the benefit level caused by 
adding the child or children receiving support, the family 
would suffer; if less than $50 and the difference in the benefit 
level was collected as support, it would not. 
II 
After North Carolina adopted regulations to comply with 
the 1984 Amendments, some members of the class that had 
earlier obtained relief filed a motion to reopen the 1971 
decree and obtain further relief on behalf of the class. 
The State impleaded the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, contending that if the State's compliance with the 
federal statute resulted in any liability to appellees, the Fed-
eral Government should share in any payment of additional 
AFDC benefits. The District Court found that North Caro-
lina's and the Department of Health and Human Services' 
regulations were in conformance with the statute, 8 but con-
8 The Secretary of Health and Human Resources promulgated the fol-
lowing regulation to implement the DEFRA amendment: 
"For AFDC purposes only, in order for the family to be eligible, an appli-
cation with respect to a dependent child must also include, if living in the 
same household and otherwise eligible for assistance: 
"(A) Any natural or adoptive parent, or stepparent (in the case of States 
with laws of general applicability); and 
'(B) Any blood-related or adoptive brother or sister." 45 CFR § 206.10 
(a)(l)(vii) (1986). 
North Carolina's implementing regulations are set forth in the District 
Court's opinion. 633 F. Supp., at 1533-1534. 
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eluded that the statutory scheme violated both the Due Proc-
ess Clause and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 9 
The court interpreted North Carolina law as imposing a 
duty on the mother to use child support money exclusively 
for the benefit of the child for whom it had been obtained, 10 
and reasoned that a forced assignment of the support money 
to the State in exchange for AFDC benefits for the entire 
family was a taking of the child's private property. Gilliard 
v. Kirk, 633 F. Supp. 1529, 1551-1555 (WDNC 1986). Addi-
tionally, the court reasoned that the use of the child's support 
money to reduce the Government's AFDC expenditures was 
tantamount to punishing of the child for exercising the funda-
mental right to live with his or her family. /d., at 1557. Be-
cause of the serious impact on the autonomy of the family-
including the child's potential relationship with his or her nat-
ural father-"special judicial scrutiny" was considered appro-
priate, id., at 1555-1557, and the deprivation of property and 
liberty effected by the statutory scheme could not, in the 
court's view, survive such scrutiny. We noted probable ju-
risdiction, 479 U. S. -- (1986). 
9 "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation." U. S. Const. , Arndt. 5. 
10 The District Court relied on the following paragraph of the opinion of 
the North Carolina Supreme Court in Goodyear v. Goodyear, 257 N. C. 
374, 379, 126 S. E. 2d 113, 117 (1962): 
"While defendant [father] was and is obligated to make the monthly pay-
ments called for in his contract for the support of his children, plaintiff 
[mother] is not the beneficiary of the moneys which defendant must pay. 
These moneys belong to the children. Plaintiff is a mere trustee for them. 
That part of the payments not reasonably necessary for support and main-
tenance, she must hold for the benefit of the children and account to them 
when they call upon her. She cannot, by contract with another person, 
profit at the expense of the children." 
The Goodyear opinion did not purport to announce any rule of law unique 
to North Carolina; it quoted from Indiana and Iowa opinions and cited 
authorities from other jurisdictions. 
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The District Court was undoubtedly correct in its percep-
tion that a number of needy families have suffered, and will 
suffer, as a result of the implementation of the DEFRA 
amendments to the AFDC program. Such suffering is fre-
quently the tragic by-product of a decision to reduce or to 
modify benefits to a class of needy recipients. Under our 
structure of government, however, it is the function of Con-
gress-not the courts-to determine whether the savings re-
alized, and presumably used for other critical governmental 
functions, are significant enough to justify the costs to the in-
dividuals affected by such reductions. The Fifth Amend-
ment "gives the federal courts no power to impose upon [Con-
gress] their views of what constitutes wise economic or social 
policy," by telling it how "to reconcile the demands of . . . 
needy citizens with the finite resources available to meet 
those demands." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 
486, 472 (1970). Unless the legislative branch's decisions run 
afoul of some constitutional edict, any inequities created by 
such decisions must be remedied by the democratic proc-
esses. The District Court believed that the amendments at 
issue did conflict with both the Due Process Clause and the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 11 We consider 
11 The only Court of Appeals, see Gorrie v. Bowen, 809 F . 2d 508 (CA8 
1987), and virtually all of the District Courts , that have addressed chal-
lenges to the inclusion of child support or other "exclusive use" funds have 
upheld the validity of these amendments, see e. g., Showers v. Cohen, 645 
F. Supp. 217 (MD Pa. 1986); Sherrod v. Hegstrom, 629 F. Supp. 150 (Ore. 
1985); Huber v. Blinzinger, 626 F. Supp. 30 (ND Ind. 1985); Oliver v. Led-
better, 624 F. Supp. 325 (ND Ga. 1985); Ardister v. Mansour, 627 F. Supp. 
641 (WD Mich. 1986) (denying preliminary injunction); Shonkwiler v. 
Heckler, 628 F. Supp. 1013 (SD Ind. 1985) (denying preliminary injunc-
tion); Cf. Park v. Coler, 143 Ill. App. 3d 727, 493 N. E. 2d 130 (1986); 
but see Lesko v. Bowen, 639 F. Supp. 1152 (ED Wis. 1986), appeal dock-
eted, No. 86-744; Baldwin v. Ledbetter, 647 F. Supp. 623 (ND Ga. 1986), 
appeal docketed, No. 86-1140, stay pending appeal granted, 479 U. S.-
(No. A-448) (1986) (POWELL, Circuit Justice). 
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these arguments in turn, and reject them. 12 
III 
The precepts that govern our review of appellees' due 
process and equal protection challenges to this program are 
similar to those we have applied in reviewing challenges to 
other parts of the Social Security Act: 
"[O]ur review is deferential. 'Governmental decisions 
to spend money to improve the general public welfare in 
one way and not another are "not confided to the courts. 
The discretion belongs to Congress unless the choice is 
clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exer-
cise of judgment."' Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 
181, 185 (1976), quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 
619, 640 (1937)." Bowen v. Owens, 476 U. S. --, --
(1986). 
This standard of review is premised on Congress' "plenary 
power to define the scope and the duration of the entitlement 
12 After ruling that the DEFRA amendment of AFDC was unconstitu-
tional, the District Court considered the form of relief appellees were enti-
tled to. In addition to granting prospective relief, the Court ordered the 
state defendants to "pay retroactive AFDC benefits to all families in North 
Carolina whose benefits were denied, reduced or terminated as a result of 
the enforcement" of the State regulations. 633 F. Supp., at 1563. In re-
sponse to the State's argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred such 
a retroactive award, the District Court explained that the "State had con-
tinuously been bound by the court's 1971 injunction, and that if the State 
believed DEFRA had changed the applicable law, it should have sought 
modification of the injunction. /d., at 1563-1564. Because we interpret 
the District Court's award of both prospective and retroactive relief to rest 
on its holding that the DEFRA amendment was unconstitutional, and read 
its discussion of the 1971 injunction as responding to the State's claim that 
an award of retroactive benefits was barred by the Eleventh Amendment, 
see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 667-668 (1974), our ruling that the 
DEFRA amendment is constitutionally valid requires reversal of both the 
District Court's award of prospective relief and its award of retroactive 
relief. 
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to ... benefits, and to increase, to decrease, or to terminate 
those benefits based on its appraisal of the relative impor-
tance of the recipients' needs and the resources available to 
fund the program." Atkins v. Parker, 472 U. S. 115, 129 
(1985); see also Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U. S. 569 (1982); 
Califano v. Boles, 443 U. S. 282, 296 (1979); California v. 
Aznavorian, 439 U. S. 170 (1978); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 
u. s. 749 (1975). 
The District Court had before it evidence that the DEFRA 
amendments were severely impacting some families. For 
example, some noncustodial parents stopped making their 
support payments because they believed that their payments 
were helping only the State, and not their children. 633 F. 
Supp., at 1542-1543. It is clear, however, that in the admin:.. 
istration of a fund that is large enough to have a significant 
impact on the Nation's deficit, general rules must be exam-
ined in light of the broad purposes they are intended to 
serve. 13 The challenged amendment unquestionably serves 
Congress' goal of decreasing federal expenditures. See Sen-
ate Report, at 981 (estimating that amendment in AFDC pro-
gram will save $455 million during fiscal years 1984 through 
1987); 130 Cong. Rec. S4099 (Apr. 9, 1984) (remarks of Sen. 
Dole). The evidence that a few noncustodial parents were 
willing to violate the law by not making court-ordered sup-
port payments does not alter the fact that the entire program 
has resulted in saving huge sums of money. 
The rationality of the amendment denying a family the 
right to exclude a supported child from the .filing unit is also 
supported by the Government's separate interest in distrib-
uting benefits among competing needy families in a fair way. 
Given its perceived need to make cuts in the AFDC budget, 
13 "General rules are essential if a fund of this magnitude is to be adminis-
tered with a modicum of efficiency, even though such rules inevitably 
produce seemingly arbitrary consequences in some individual cases. 
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 776." Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47, 
53 (1977). 
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·Congress obviously sought to identify a group that would suf-
fer less than others as a result of a reduction in benefits. 
When considering the plight of two five-person families, one 
of which receives no income at all while the other receives 
regular support payments for some of the minor children, it is 
surely reasonable for Congress to conclude that the former is 
in greater need than the latter. This conclusion is amply 
supported by Congress' assumption that child support pay-
ments received are generally beneficial to the entire family 
unit, see Senate Report, at 980, and by "the common sense 
proposition that individuals living with others usually have 
reduced per capita costs because many of their expenses are 
shared." Termini v. Califano, 611 F. 2d 367, 370 (CA2 
1979); see also Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U. S. --, -- (1986). 14 
It was therefore rational for Congress to adjust the AFDC 
program to reflect the fact that support money generally pro-
vides significant benefits for entire family units. This con-
clusion is not undermined by the fact that there are no doubt 
"An assumption that child support payments to families receiving 
AFDC benefits are typically used for the entire family's needs is entirely 
reasonable. See Senate Report, at 980 (amendment will "ensure that the 
income of family members who live together and share expenses is recog-
nized"). This conclusion does not rest on an assumption that custodial par-
ents routinely violate state law restrictions on the use of support money. 
For the requirement that the support income be used for the "benefit" of 
the child does not preclude its use for common expenses. Moreover, the 
custodial parent's duty to benefit the supported child is not necessarily 
served simply by spendirig more money on him or her than on other chil-
dren living in the same home. As the District Court recognized, nothing 
in North Carolina law requires a custodial parent to focus only on the eco-
nomic interest of the child receiving support without taking into account 
the emotional and psychological welfare of the child. Congress' finding 
that custodial parents were routinely using the support funds for the entire 
family thus reflects the reality that such use is typically proper since ex-
penditures for an entire family unit typically benefit each member of the 
household. We do not question Congress' reliance on the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services' assurance that counting child support income 
as part of the family income "much more realistically reflects the actual 
home situation." Heckler Letter, App. 168-169. 
86-509 & 86-564-0PINION 
BOWEN v. GILLIARD 13 
many families in which some-or perhaps all-of the support 
money is spent in a way that does not benefit the rest of the 
family. In determining how best to allocate limited funds 
among the extremely large class of needy families eligible 
for AFDC benefits, Congress is entitled to rely on a class-
wide presumption that custodial parents have used, and may 
legitimately use, support funds in a way that is beneficial to 
entire family units. As we have repeatedly explained: 
"If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does 
not offend the Constitution simply because the classifica-
tion 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in 
practice it results in some inequality.' Lindsley v. Nat-
ural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78. 'The problems 
of government are practical ones and may justify, if they 
do not require, rough accommodations-illogical, it may 
be, and unscientific.' Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of 
Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 69-70. "A statutory discrimina-
tion will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably 
may be conceived to justify it.' McGowan v. Maryland, 
366 U. S. 420, 426.'' Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., 
at 485. 
See also Weinberger v. Salji, 422 U. S., at 785. We have no 
doubt that the DEFRA amendment satisfies this test. 15 
Appellees argue (and the District Court ruled), however, 
that finding that Congress acted rationally is not enough to 
sustain this legislation. Rather, they claim that some form 
'
6 Congress' presumption is similar to the one made in § 402(a)(31), 
42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(31), which provides that portions of a stepparent's 
income are to be considered as part of the family income for AFDC pur-
poses. In Brown v. Heckler, 589 F. Supp. 985 (ED Pa. 1984), affirmed, 
760 F. 2d 255 (CA3 1985), the court explained that the presumption that 
a stepparent will assist in supporting his or her spouse's children is 
rational, even though stepparents are under no legal duty to assist the 
children, and not every stepparent does. See also Kollett v. Harris, 619 
F. 2d 134 (CA11980) (holding that inclusion of stepparent's income as avail-
able to child in the Supplemental Security Income program was not uncon-
stitutionally irrational). 
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of "heightened scrutiny" is appropriate because the amend-
ment interferes with a family's fundamental right to live in 
the type of family unit it chooses. 16 We conclude that the 
District Court erred in subjecting the DEFRA amendment to 
any form of heightened scrutiny. That some families may 
decide to modify their living arrangements in order to avoid 
the effect of the amendment, does not transform the amend-
ment into an act whose design and direct effect is to "in-
trud[e] on choices concerning family living arrangements." 
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 499 (1977). 17 As 
was the case with the marriage-related provision upheld in 
Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47 (1977), "Congress adopted 
this rule in the course of constructing a complex social wel-
fare system that necessarily deals with the intimacies of fam-
ily life. This is not a case in which government seeks to foist 
orthodoxy on the unwilling." ld., at 54, n. 11. 
Last Term we rejected a constitutional challenge to a pro-
vision in the Federal Food Stamp Program, which deter-
mines eligibility and benefit levels on a "household" rather 
than an individual basis. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U. S. --
(1986). 18 We held that the guarantee of equal treatment in 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment was not vio-
16 For example, the District Court had before it an affidavit from one 
mother who stated that she had sent a child to live with the child's father 
in order to avoid the requirement of including that child, and the support 
received from the child's father, in the AFDC unit. 633 F . Supp. , at 
1537-1538. 
17 If the DEFRA amendment's indirect effects on family living arrange-
ments were enough to subject the statute to heightened scrutiny, then the 
entire AFDC program might also be suspect since it provides benefits only 
to ~eedy families without two resident parents. Surely this creates incen-
tive for some needy parents to live separately. The answer, of course, is 
that these types of incentives are the unintended consequences of many so-
cial welfare programs, and do not call the legitimacy qf the programs into 
question. 
18 The District Court denied appellants' motion for reconsideration in 
light of our decision in Lyng. App. to Juris. Statement in No. 86-509, 
p. 107a. 
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lated by the statutory requirement that generally treated 
parents, children, and siblings who lived together as a single 
household, and explained: 
"The disadvantaged class is that comprised by parents, 
children, and siblings. Close relatives are not a 'sus-
pect' or 'quasi-suspect' class. As a historical matter, 
they have not been subjected to discrimination; they do 
not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing charac-
teristics that define them as a discrete group; and they 
are not a minority or politically powerless. See, e. g., 
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 
U. S. 307, 313-314 (1976) (per curiam). In fact, quite 
the contrary is true. 
· "Nor does the statutory classification 'directly and 
substantially' interfere with family living arrangements 
and thereby burden a fundamental right. Zablocki v. 
Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 386-387, and n. 12 (1978). See 
id., at 403-404 (STEVENS, J., concurring); Califano v. 
Jobst, 434 U. S. 47, 58 (1977)." · I d., at-. 
In light of this, we concluded in Lyng that the "District Court 
erred in judging the constitutionality of the statutory distinc-
tion under 'heightened scrutiny.'" I d., at--. In this case 
the District Court committed the same error. As in Lyng, 
the standard of review here is whether "Congress had a ra-
tional basis" for its decision. I d., at --. And as in Lyng, 
"the justification for the statutory classification is obvious." 
I d., at --. The provisions at issue do not violate the Due 
Process Clause. 19 
19 Nor is there any merit in the contention that the assignment provision, 
see supra, at 4, and n. 4, violates the Due Process Clause. Once it is de-
termined that it is permissible to include all members of the family in the 
unit, the assignment of the benefits typically has no adverse effect on the 
child receiving support. To the contrary, through the assignment provi-
sion the Government takes over the responsibility of making sure that 
noncustodial parents actually perform their child support obligations. The 
State also bears the risk of nonpayment of support, since the family re-
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IV 
Aside from holding that the amendment violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and its equal protec-
tion component, The District Court iJ?,validated the DEFRA 
amendment as a taking of private property without just com-
pensation. The court based this holding on the premise that 
a child for whom support payments are made has a right to 
have the support money used exclusively in his or her "best 
interest." Yet, the court reasoned, the requirements (1) 
that a custodial parent who applies for AFDC must include a 
child's support money in computing family income, and (2) 
that the support must be assigned to the State, effectively 
converts the support funds that were once to be used exclu-
sively for the child's best interests into an AFDC check 
which, under federal law, must be used for the benefit of all 
the children. §405, 42 U. S.C. §605. Therefore, the Dis-
trict Court held that the state was "taking" that child's right 
to exclusive use of the support money. In addressing this 
issue, it is helpful to look first at whether the state "takes" 
the child's property when it considers the support payments 
as part of the family's income in computing AFDC eligibility. 
We will then consider whether the requirement that support 
payments be assigned to the State requires a finding that the 
amendments violate the taking prohibition. 
Some perspective on the issue is helpful here. Had no 
AFDC program ever existed until 1984, and had Congress 
then instituted a program that took into account support pay-
ceives the identical amount of AFDC (although not the $50 supplement) 
whether or not the absent parent makes payments. In the first ten years 
following the adoption of the assignment requirement in 1975, legal pater-
nity was established for more than 1.5 million children, more than 3.5 mil-
lion support orders were established, and $6.8 billion in support obligations 
was collected on behalf of children in AFDC families. Office of Child Sup-
port Enforcement, U. S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, A Decade of 
Child Support Enforcement 1975-1985: Tenth Annual Report to Congress 
for the Period Ending September 30, 1985, pp. iii, 6, 9-10 (1985). 
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ments that a family receives, it is hard to believe that we 
would seriously entertain an argument that the new benefit 
program constituted a taking. Yet, somehow, once benefits 
are in place and Congress sees a need to reduce them in order 
to save money and to distribute limited resources more 
fairly, the "takings" label seems to have a bit more plausi-
bility. For legal purposes though, the two situations are 
identical. See Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social 
Security Entrapment, 477 U. S. -- (1986). Congress is 
not, by virtue of having instituted a social welfare program, 
bound to continue it at all, much less at the same benefit 
level. Thus, notwithstanding the technical legal arguments 
that have been advanced, it is imperative to recognize that 
the amendment at issue merely incorporates a definitional 
element into an entitlement program. It would be quite 
strange indeed if, by virtue of an offer to provide benefits to 
needy families through· the entirely voluntary AFDC pro-
gram, Congress or the States were deemed to have taken 
some of those very family members' property. 
The basic requirement that the AFDC filing unit must in-
clude all family members living in the home, and therefore 
that support payments made on behalf of a member of the 
family must be considered in determining that family's level 
of benefits, does not even arguably take anyone's property. 
The family members other than the child for whom the sup-
port is being paid certainly have no taking claim, since it is 
clear that they have no protected property rights to contin-
ued benefits at the same level. See Public Agencies Op-
posed to Social Security Entrapment, supra. Nor does the 
simple inclusion of the support income in the benefit calcula-
tion have any legal effect on the child's right to have it used 
for his or her benefit. To the extent that a child has the 
right to have the support payments used in his "best inter-
est," he or she fully retains that right. Of course, the effect 
of counting the support payments as part of the filing unit's 
income often reduces the family's resources , and hence in-
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creases the chances that sharing of the support money will be 
appropriate. See n. 13, supra. But given the unquestioned 
premise that the Government has a right to reduce AFDC 
benefits generally, that result does not constitute a taking of 
private property without just compensation. 
The only possible legal basis for appellees' takings claim, 
therefore, is the requirement that an applicant for AFDC 
benefits must assign the support payments to the State, 
which then will remit the amount collected to the custodial 
parent to be used for the benefit of the entire family. This 
legal transformation in the status of the funds, the argument 
goes, modifies the the child's interest in the use of the money 
so dramatically that it constitutes a taking of the child's 
property. As a practical matter, this argument places form 
over substance, and labels over reality. Although it is true 
that money which was earmarked for a specific child's or 
.children's "best interest" becomes a part of a larger fund 
available for all of the children, the difference between these 
concepts is, as we have discussed, more theoretical than 
practical. 20 
In evaluating whether governmental regulation of prop-
erty constitutes a "taking" we have "eschewed the develop-
ment of any set formula ... and have relied instead on ad 
hoc, factual inquiries into the circumstances of each particu-
20 In analyzing the effect of the assignment it is again instructive to ask 
what would happen to the support payments if there were no AFDC pro-
gram at all. In that case, it would appear that custodial parents would 
have to use a much greater portion of the support payments to sustain the 
family unit, since it could hardly be deemed in the child's best interest for 
his custodial parent and siblings to have no funds whatsoever. The overall · 
practical effect of the AFDC program (even after the 1984 amendment), 
therefore, is to enhance the probability that a child whose custodial parent 
is receiving support payments in the child's behalf will obtain direct eco-
nomic benefit from those funds, in addition to the benefits that result from 
preserving the family unit. A reduction in that enhancement is no more a 
taking than any other reduction in a Social Security program. 
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lar case." Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 
u. s. 211, 224 (1986). . 
"To aid in this determination, however, we have iden-
tified three factors which have 'particular significance': 
(1) 'the economic impact of the regulation on the claim-
ant'; (2) 'the extent to which the regulation has inter-
fered with distinct investment-backed expectations'; and 
(3) 'the character of the governmental action.' Penn 
Central Transportation Co., [438 U. S. 104,] 124.'' Id., 
at 224-225. 
Here, each of these three factors refutes the conclusion that 
there has been a taking. 
First, in evaluating the economic impact of the assignment, 
it is important to remember that it is the impact on the child, 
not on the entire family unit, that is relevant. Thus, the fact 
that the entire family's net income may be reduced does not 
necessarily mean that the amount of money spent for the ben-
efit of a supported child will be any less than the amount of 
the noncustodial parent's support payments. The reality is 
that the money will usually continue to be used in the same 
manner that it was previously since the typical AFDC parent 
will have used the support money as part of the general fam-
ily fund even without its being transferred through AFDC. 
Seen. 13, supra. Moreover, any diminution in the value of 
the support payments for the child is mitigated by the extra 
$50 that the family receives as a result of the assignment, by 
the extra AFDC benefits that are received by the inclusion 
of an additional family member in the unit, and by the fact 
that the State is using its own enforcement power to collect 
the support payments, and is bearing the risk of nonpayment 
in any given month. Whatever the diminution in value of 
the child's right to have support funds used for his or her 
"exclusive" benefit may be, it is not so substantial as to con-
stitute a taking under our precedents. See Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S. --, --
(1987); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980); Penn 
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Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 
131 (1978). 
Second, the child receiving support payments holds no 
vested protectable expectation that his or her parent will 
continue to receive identical support payments on the child's 
behalf, and that the child will enjoy the same rights with re-
spect to them. See Layton v. Layton, 263 N. C. 453, 456, 
139 S. E. 2d 732, 734 (1965) (support is "not a property right 
of the child"). The prospective right to support payments, 
and the child's expectations with respect to the use of such 
funds, are clearly subject to modification by law, be it 
through judicial decree, state legislation, or Congressional 
enactments. See N. C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.7 (1984) (modifi-
cation of order for child support). For example, one of the 
chief criteria in assessing a child-support obligation is the 
noncustodial parent's ability to make payments, see Coggins 
v. Coggins, 260 N. C. 765, 133 S. E. 2d 700 (1963); Douglas, 
Factors in Determining Child Support, 36 Juvenile & Family 
Court Journal, No. 3, p. 27 (1985), and an adverse change in 
that parent's ability may, of course, require a modification of 
the decree. 2 J. Atkinson, Modern Child Custody Practice 
§ 10.25, pp. 527-528 (1986) (discussing reductions in support). 
Any right to have the State force a noncustodial parent to 
make payments is, like so many other legal rights (including 
AFDC payments themselves), subject to modification by "the 
public acts of government." Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 
U. S. 315, 319 (1932); see generally Public Agencies Opposed 
to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U. S., at--. As the 
District Court explained, Congress, and the States, through 
their implementing statutes and regulations, have modified 
those rights through passage of (and the States' compliance 
with) the DEFRA amendments. See 633 F. Supp., at 1548-
1551; Gorrie v. Bowen, 809 F. 2d 508, 521 (CA8 1987). This 
prospective change in the child's expectations concerning fu-
ture use of support payments is far from anything we have 
ever deemed a taking. 
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Finally, the character of the governmental action here mili-
tates against a finding that the States or Federal Govern-
ment unconstitutionally take property through the AFDC 
program. It is obviously necessary for the Government to 
make hard choices and to balance various incentives in decid-
ing how to allocate benefits in this type of program. But a 
decision to include child support as part of the family income 
certainly does not implicate the type of concerns that the 
takings clause protects. This is by no means an enactment 
that forces "some people alone to bear public burdens which, 
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public 
as a whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 
(1960). 
The law does not require any custodial parent to apply for 
AFDC benefits. Surely it is reasonable to presume that a 
parent who does make such an application does so because 
she or he is convinced that the family as a whole-as well as 
each child committed to her or his custody-will be better off 
with the benefits than without. In making such a decision, 
the parent is not taking a child's property without just com-
pensation; nor is the State doing so when it responds to that 
decision by supplementing the collections of support money 
with additional AFDC benefits. 
v 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Stewart described 
the courts' role in cases such as this: 
"We do not decide today that the . . . regulation is 
wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic 
objectives that [Congress] might ideally espouse, or that 
a more just and humane system could not be devised. 
Conflicting claims of morality and intelligence are raised 
by opponents and proponents of almost every measure, 
certainly including the one before us. But the intracta-
ble economic, social, and even philosophical problems 
presented by public welfare assistance programs are not 
22 
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the business of this Court. The Constitution may im-
pose certain procedural safeguards upon systems of wel-
fare administration, Goldberg v. Kelly, ante, p. 254. 
But the Constitution does not empower this Court to 
second-guess . . . officials charged with the difficult 
responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds 
among the myriad of potential recipients." Dandridge 
v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 487. 
The judgment of the District Court is 
Reversed. 
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